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ABSTRACT
The field of behavioral legal ethics—which draws on a large 
body of empirical research to explore how subtle and often 
unconscious psychological factors influence ethical decision-making 
by lawyers—has gained significant attention recently, including by 
many scholars who have called for a pedagogy that incorporates 
behavioral lessons into the professional responsibility curriculum. 
This Article provides one of the first comprehensive accounts of how 
law teachers can meet this challenge. Based on an approach that 
employs a variety of experiential techniques to immerse students in 
the contextual and emotional aspects of legal practice, it provides a 
detailed model of how to teach legal ethics from a behavioral 
perspective. Reflections on the approach, including the encouraging 
response expressed by students to this interdisciplinary method of 
instruction, are also discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There may be no area of legal education that is more maligned, 
or that has received more calls for reform, than the professional 
responsibility curriculum.1 Described once as the “Cinderella” of the 
law school experience because it is often “tolerated, rarely loved,”2
there has been no shortage of proposed fixes. Some have focused on 
methodological changes, for example, arguing that ethics be taught 
pervasively throughout the curriculum3 or from a contextual 
perspective such as in specialized, semester-long classes that focus 
                                                     
 1. Many have noted the disrepute the professional responsibility 
curriculum suffers inside law schools. See Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A 
Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 502 (2009); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 43, 43 
(2009); Stephen Gillers, “Eat Your Spinach?”, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1215, 1216-18 
(2007). And yet, despite these many criticisms, professional responsibility may be 
more pertinent than any other subject to the daily lives of lawyers and, as a result, is 
one of the most important courses in law school. See, e.g., Gillers, supra, at 1220. 
 2. Id. at 1218.  
 3. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the 
Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992). The benefits of the pervasive 
method are described in the influential Carnegie Report on Legal Education. See
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 151-52 (2007).  
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on particular subject matter.4 Others have called for substantive 
curricular reform, for example, by focusing more explicitly on 
teaching moral reasoning,5 teaching the foundations of virtue theory,6
or teaching from a philosophical7 or sociological perspective.8 And 
then there are some who have synthesized many proposals for 
change arguing that unless ethics is taught pervasively, in context, 
and with an emphasis on how students develop and grow in moral 
capacity, then it will remain “a second class citizen” of legal 
education.9
While these suggestions deserve the attention they have 
received, this Article focuses on a different approach, one that is 
grounded in decades of empirical research from behavioral science. 
Recently dubbed “Behavioral Legal Ethics,”10 the central idea is that 
unethical conduct is frequently the product of psychological factors 
that occur largely outside of the conscious awareness of the decision-
maker. The result is that well-intentioned lawyers will often be 
unaware of how their behavior diverges from their own conceptions 
of themselves as ethical and honest people. 
Recognizing the importance of teaching legal ethics from a 
behavioral perspective is nothing new. Indeed, more than a decade 
ago, one leading scholar stated rather bluntly: “[P]rofessional 
responsibility professors who ignore the psychological 
                                                     
 4. See generally Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in 
Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357 (1998); Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing 
Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 193 (1995). One of the leaders in this movement, Fordham Law School, has 
offered a variety of context-specific courses, such as ethics in tax law, corporate law, and 
criminal law, among others. See Green, supra, at 372-73. Other forms of context-based 
instruction have also been developed. See, e.g., id. at 371-72 (describing week-long 
intensives, such as Duke’s intensive course on ethics in civil litigation). 
 5. See generally Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through 
Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995). But see W. Bradley Wendel, 
Moral Judgment and Professional Legitimation, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1071 (arguing 
that legal ethics instruction should not focus on improving general moral reasoning). 
 6. See generally Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous 
Lawyer: Part One of a Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J.
LEGAL PROF. 5 (1996). 
 7. See generally Nathan M. Crystal, Using the Concept of “A Philosophy of 
Lawyering” in Teaching Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1235 (2007). 
 8. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, a Case 
Study, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 822 (2000). 
 9. See Russell Pearce, Legal Ethics Must Be the Heart of the Law School 
Curriculum, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 159, 159 (2002). 
 10. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal 
Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1112-13 (2013). 
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underpinnings of moral reasoning are plainly guilty of educational 
malpractice.”11 Others have voiced similar, albeit perhaps less stark, 
recommendations for a curriculum of legal ethics that incorporates 
an interdisciplinary approach based on behavioral science.12
Yet, despite these calls for a behavioral approach to the legal 
ethics curriculum, little has been written for law teachers who want 
to adopt such a pedagogy in their classrooms.13 In part, this might be 
                                                     
 11. Mary C. Daly, Teaching Integrity in the Professional Responsibility
Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 261, 268-69 n.37 
(2003).
 12. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND.
L.J. 1639, 1668-69 (2015); Nancy Rapoport, Changing the Modal Law School: 
Rethinking U.S. Legal Education in (Most) Schools, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1119, 1152 
(2012); Rhode, supra note 1, at 51; Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad 
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1585-86 (2009); Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics, 51 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1043, 1045 (2007) [hereinafter Teaching Legal Ethics]; Richard W. 
Painter, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur Solmssen’s The 
Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1127 (2000). Scholars have also 
broadened this discussion, arguing for an infusion of psychology of lawyering 
throughout the law school curriculum. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering: Insights for Legal Educators, 64 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 365, 375-77 (2015); see also Robert C. Bordone, The Lawyer as Bias 
Buffer or Bias Aggravator, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 448-49 (Jon Hanson 
ed., 2012) (arguing that, to be competent as future practitioners, law students ought to 
be familiar with the literature on cognitive biases and heuristics). Interestingly, some of 
the most extensive discussions regarding the need for a behavioral approach to ethics 
education come from business school professors rather than legal educators. See, e.g.,
Minette Drumwright et al., Behavioral Ethics and Teaching Ethical Decision Making,
13 DECISION SCI. J. INNOVATIVE EDUC. 431 (2015); Robert Prentice, Teaching 
Behavioral Ethics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 325, 326 (2014); Michael B. Metzger, 
Bridging the Gaps: Cognitive Constraints on Corporate Control & Ethics Education,
16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 435 (2005). This is not surprising given that many of the 
primary researchers in the area teach in business schools. 
 13. This is not to say that the subject has been completely overlooked in the 
law school curriculum. For instance, two leading scholars who have written about 
behavioral science and legal ethics have integrated readings from the field into their 
well-known course book. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
448-56 (5th ed. 2009). And another casebook incorporates important findings from 
the much larger body of judgment and decision-making literature about factors that 
can influence ethical judgment. See generally DAVID MCGOWAN, DEVELOPING 
JUDGMENT ABOUT PRACTICING LAW (2d ed. 2013). Included in this approach are 
some exciting pedagogical methods—such as problems focusing on the power of the 
psychology of framing and explanations of prospect theory and loss aversion—that 
can help students understand aspects of behavioral science. Id. at 39, 58-60, 80-81; 
see also David McGowan, Politics, Office Politics, and Legal Ethics: A Case Study 
in the Strategy of Judgment, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1057 (2007) (explaining why 
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because, until recently, there has been no easily accessible, yet 
comprehensive, overview of the behavioral research that can act as a 
primer for those not familiar with the foundations of the science in 
the area. That has now changed with the publication of recent 
scholarship providing a broad account of the various psychological 
factors that influence ethical judgment and behavior of lawyers.14
As a result, the time is now ripe for a discussion on how best to 
teach behavioral legal ethics in the professional responsibility 
curriculum. This Article, a comprehensive account of how to 
integrate behavioral science into legal ethics education, is one of the 
first in that direction.15 Drawing on my own experience, I describe a 
two-track approach in my survey course on legal ethics:16 The first 
integrates the core tenets of behavioral science into classroom 
discussions, while the second utilizes a more in-depth examination of 
the subject matter through an extra credit assignment in which 
students read, comment on, and help produce a class blog developed 
for the course. 
What follows is my account of teaching from this perspective. 
It is written primarily for two audiences: those who have little 
                                                                                                                
judgment and decision-making theory, including the literature on heuristics and 
cognitive biases, should be taught as part of the legal ethics curriculum). 
 14. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 12, at 1668; Catherine Gage O’Grady, 
Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making, and the New Attorney’s Unique 
Professional Perspective, 15 NEV. L.J. 671 (2015); Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral
Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be Their Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2015); Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10; Kath 
Hall, Why Good Intentions are Often Not Enough: The Potential for Ethical 
Blindness in Legal Decision-Making, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK 
AND NEW IDEAS (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010). For a slightly earlier overview of 
research in the field, published in 2009 as a book review, see Levin, supra note 12. 
This is not to discount the large body of legal scholarship that, for some time, has 
addressed the psychology of ethical decision-making. But this earlier scholarship 
has focused largely on specific domains of lawyer decision-making—see, for 
example, infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text—rather than developing a 
comprehensive account of how psychology and related disciplines help to explain 
lawyer ethics. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1112-13 (noting that, 
as of 2013, there had been no “comprehensive survey of the implications of 
psychology for legal ethics”). 
 15. Another approach developed by educators in Australia focuses on 
teaching behavioral legal ethics using a curriculum modeled after an approach 
originally created for business schools. See Vivien Holmes, ‘Giving Voice to 
Values’: Enhancing Students’ Capacity to Cope with Ethical Challenges in Legal 
Practice, 18 LEGAL ETHICS 115 (2015). For a more complete description, see infra
notes 231-35 and accompanying text.  
 16. The three-credit course, taught during the second year, is a required part 
of the curriculum. 
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familiarity with the research on behavioral legal ethics but who are 
curious about whether and how to incorporate a behavioral approach 
into the professional responsibility curriculum, and those familiar 
with behavioral science who are seeking new ways to teach the 
material to their students. Part II describes this approach. It starts 
with a brief review of the literature for those who may need 
grounding in the subject and then turns to the mechanics of the 
course in some detail. Part III reflects on the experience, starting 
with student reactions to this method of instruction—which, on the 
whole, have been quite positive—suggesting that incorporating 
lessons from behavioral science can add a valuable dimension to the 
legal ethics curriculum. Also discussed is the importance of staying 
current on developments in the field of behavioral science, as well as 
some thoughts on other approaches and future directions in the field. 
II. TEACHING BEHAVIORAL LEGAL ETHICS
A. Understanding Behavioral Science 
Many who teach professional responsibility may have an 
understanding of behavioral legal ethics, so for them there is no need 
for a briefing on the literature in the field. For others who may need 
to develop a base of knowledge on the relevant science, there is a 
long list of available resources upon which to draw. 
The best place to start is with the scholarship that provides an 
overview of the field. There has been some excellent recent writing 
in this area, such as the comprehensive account provided by Jennifer 
Robbennolt and Jean Sternlight in their seminal article Behavioral
Legal Ethics,17 which coined the name for this emerging subject.18 In 
it, the authors survey many factors that can blind lawyers from 
seeing both their own ethical missteps and those of others. These 
include a discussion of the mental tricks and distortions that cause 
everyone, lawyers included, to make predictable errors in ethical 
judgment;19 the dynamics between the ambiguous rules that regulate 
lawyer behavior, the social forces and pressures in law practice, and 
the nature of the adversarial system that can cause lawyers to act 
against their own ethics;20 the psychological reasons why it is so easy 
                                                     
 17. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10. 
 18. Id. For another excellent overview of the field, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Behavioral Ethics Meets Legal Ethics, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 75 (2015). 
 19. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1114-24. 
 20. Id. at 1124-53. 
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to rationalize misbehavior after it happens;21 and what social science 
tells us about the best ways to resist and overcome these 
psychological roadblocks.22 The connective tissue between these 
many factors is that they all work in subtle, often unconscious ways 
to permit people to live under the illusion of their own ethicality, 
making it difficult to perceive ethical lapses when they occur. 
After gaining an overview of the science, an instructor may 
want to delve deeper into the research. Again, many resources are 
available. For those who want a broader perspective on the 
psychological components of ethical blind spots, there are a number 
of excellent, easily accessible works by some of the primary 
researchers in the field of behavioral ethics.23 These include Blind
Spots by Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel24 and Mistakes Were 
Made (but not by me) by Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson.25 In 
addition, there are many excellent books that describe the extensive 
body of research on cognitive biases and heuristics—the area that 
undergirds much of the literature in behavioral ethics.26 Two of the 
                                                     
 21. Id. at 1153-56. 
22. Id. at 1156-81. 
 23. “Behavioral ethics,” which describes the field of study more generally, 
has been defined in various ways, all with slight variations of emphasis. See Max H. 
Bazerman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding 
of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85, 90 tbl.1 (2012). 
For present purposes, I adopt a broad definition provided by two of the leading 
experts in the field who define behavioral ethics as “the study of systematic and 
predictable ways in which individuals make ethical decisions and judge the ethical 
decisions of others, ways that are at odds with intuition and the benefits of the 
broader society.” Id. at 90; see also Drumwright et al., supra note 12, at 451 
(“Behavioral ethics focuses on understanding cognitive errors, social and 
organizational pressures, and situational factors that can prompt people who do not 
intend to do anything wrong to engage in unethical behavior.”). 
 24. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE
FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2012). 
 25. CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY 
ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS (2008).  
 26. The body of literature describing research on heuristics and biases is 
vast, but almost always comes back to the foundational work of Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the 
Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973). “Heuristics” describes the 
many mental shortcuts that humans employ to make decisions under uncertainty. 
“Biases” describes the ways in which these mental shortcuts produce judgments that 
deviate systematically from those that would result from pure rationality. See
Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and 
Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 1-3 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). The application of the underlying research in 
the heuristics and biases literature to law, often described as “behavioral law and 
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most well-known are Thinking, Fast and Slow by Nobel award- 
winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman27 and Nudge by two leading 
experts, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein.28 Another excellent book, 
written specifically for the legal profession, is Psychology for 
Lawyers by Jennifer Robbennolt and Jean Sternlight.29 These and 
other available resources30 provide a thorough explanation of how 
human cognition causes systematic and predictable errors in 
judgment, including errors that produce unethical behavior. 
A number of online resources are also available. For example, a 
treasure trove of behavioral research is posted on 
EthicalSystems.org, a site dedicated to promoting ethical conduct in 
the business community.31 Another resource, Ethics Unwrapped, a 
project of McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at 
Austin, contains excellent videos and other teaching materials to 
assist educators interested in integrating behavioral ethics into the 
                                                                                                                
economics,” is also vast; indeed, the seminal work in the field has been identified as 
the most cited law review article in any subject from 1995-2011. See Russell 
Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1653, 1654-55 (2011). 
 27. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).  
 28. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
 29. This book provides a rich description of many other aspects of the 
psychology of lawyering, including many social forces that influence decision-
making by lawyers. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT,
PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN 
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 115-40 (2012). 
 30. There are other excellent books that describe many of the findings from 
behavioral research for a general audience. See generally THOMAS GILOVICH & LEE 
ROSS, THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM: HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY’S MOST POWERFUL INSIGHTS (2015); NICHOLAS EPLEY, MINDWISE:
HOW WE UNDERSTAND WHAT OTHERS THINK, BELIEVE, FEEL, AND WANT (2014); 
MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF 
GOOD PEOPLE (2013); FRANCESCA GINO, SIDETRACKED: WHY OUR DECISIONS GET 
DERAILED, AND HOW WE CAN STICK TO THE PLAN (2013); DAN ARIELY, THE 
(HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY (2012). This last work by Professor Ariely has 
recently been made into a movie of the same name. See (DIS)HONESTY – THE TRUTH
ABOUT LIES (The (Dis)Honesty Project 2015), http://thedishonestyproject.com/film/ 
[https://perma.cc/4J4K-YXXP]. For those looking for more academic discussions of 
the field, see, for example, HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 26; JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).  
 31. See ETHICAL SYS., http://ethicalsystems.org [https://perma.cc/R4FA-
DJRC] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). Many of the primary researchers in the field of 
behavioral ethics are contributors to the EthicalSystems.org project. See Who We 
Are, ETHICAL SYS., http://ethicalsystems.org/content/who-we-are#collaborators 
[https://perma.cc/M3EW-38Q7] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
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business school curriculum.32 These and other resources,33 while not 
generated specifically for the legal community, provide an excellent 
overview of the core aspects of behavioral ethics that can provide a 
foundation for anyone interested in learning about the research in the 
field.
Finally, for those who want a deeper psychological explanation 
specifically focused on legal ethics, there is a full body of legal 
scholarship. These works fall into roughly two categories. The first 
applies behavioral science research in various specific domains. So, 
for example, scholars have focused on many of the heuristics and 
cognitive biases that influence ethical judgments of lawyers in a 
variety of settings, including corporate lawyers,34 criminal lawyers,35
                                                     
 32. See Ethics Unwrapped, U. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN MCCOMBS SCH. OF BUS.,
http://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu [https://perma.cc/TL6V-DXHT] (last visited Sept. 
23, 2016). For further details about the Ethics Unwrapped approach, see infra note 
240 and accompanying text. A growing body of scholarship focusing on the role that 
behavioral ethics plays in the world of business is also available. For a sampling, see 
BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS: SHAPING AN EMERGING FIELD (David De Cremer & 
Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2012). 
 33. Other resources include high-quality (and free!) online courses. See,
e.g., Social Sciences, COURSERA, https://www.coursera.org/browse/socialsciences? 
languages=en&source=deprecated_spark_cdp [https://perma.cc/527VAWP4] (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2016); The Science of Everyday Thinking, EDX, 
https://www.edx.org/course/science-everyday-thinking-uqx-think101x-2 [https://perma.cc/ 
E3DZ-VTNX] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). Blogs and podcasts are also available on 
the subject. See, e.g., Hidden Brain: A Conversation About Life’s Unseen Patterns, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO, http://www.npr.org/series/423302056/hidden-brain [https://perma.cc/X5PS-
9A3F] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016); YOU ARE NOT SO SMART, http://youarenotsosmart.com
[https://perma.cc/FGX8-ABGK] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).  
 34. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House 
Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 519 
(2012) [hereinafter Getting (Too) Comfortable]; Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? 
Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129, 159 (2011); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into 
Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 77 (1993).  
 35. Behavioral science has been applied to explain the conduct of 
prosecutors. See, e.g., DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S
RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012); Alafair S. Burke, 
Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006). Behavioral science has also been applied to 
explain the conduct of defense attorneys. See, e.g., Tigran W. Eldred, Motivation 
Matters: Guideline 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for Preventing Lawyers from 
Surrendering to Self-Interest in Responding to Allegations of Ineffective Assistance 
in Death Penalty Cases, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473 (2013) [hereinafter Motivation 
Matters]; Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving 
Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 340-
44, 357-59 (2013) [hereinafter Ethical Blindness]; Tigran W. Eldred, The 
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solo practitioners,36 and large firm lawyers.37 Other scholars have 
broadened their perspective by focusing less on a particular practice 
setting and more on how the mechanics of decision-making raise 
fundamental questions about legal ethics theory.38
The second area of scholarship focuses on what is known as 
“situationism,” that is, the general notion that the subtle aspects of a 
situation often play a significant role in how decisions are reached.39
In the ethical domain, most of this work has focused on two related 
situational variables that have received extensive scrutiny: the power 
of an authority figure to command obedience and the power of a 
group to exert pressure on an individual to conform to the group’s 
perspective.40 Relying on classic studies on obedience and 
conformity from social psychology, these scholars have explored 
situational variables in various settings, including how subordinate 
attorneys can be expected to respond to the cues they receive from 
their superiors41 and how newly minted attorneys can be expected to 
respond to various social pressures.42 Other scholars have focused on 
specific practice settings, for example, exploring how conformity 
and obedience pressures influence the relationship between corporate 
clients and their attorneys,43 or how social influence affects the 
conduct of government lawyers.44
                                                                                                                
Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 74-76 
(2009) [hereinafter Psychology of Conflicts]. 
 36. See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small 
Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309 (2004). 
 37. See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, “Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: 
Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law Firms, 4 ST.
MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 42 (2014). 
 38. See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 12. 
 39. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 8-11 (1991); see also THOMAS BLASS, THE
MAN WHO SHOCKED THE WORLD: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF STANLEY MILGRAM xxii 
(2009) (noting that situationism is the “defining theoretical stance of contemporary 
social psychology”). 
 40. See Catherine Gage O’Grady, Wrongful Obedience and the 
Professional Practice of Law, 19 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 9, 19 (2013). 
 41. Id.; see also Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate 
Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 452 (2007). 
 42. See O’Grady, supra note 14, at 682-84. 
 43. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside 
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1003-04, 1008, 1044-45 (2005); 
see also Kim, supra note 34, at 150, 159, 161. 
 44. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and 
Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 41-42, 47 (2009); see also Cassandra Burke 
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In sum, there is a wealth of excellent scholarship that can help 
any instructor learn about the psychological dimensions of ethical 
judgments that lawyers make. The next step, which is just emerging, 
is how to teach this material as part of the ethics curriculum. 
B. Teaching Methodology 
The perspective I have taken over the last two years teaches 
behavioral science as a core aspect of my ethics class.45 The approach 
works on two tracks. The first integrates many of the central 
concepts from behavioral science into classroom discussions using a 
variety of techniques that have proven effective in other contexts to 
increase student engagement—such as participatory exercises that 
allow students to experience firsthand some of the illusions and 
cognitive biases well-documented in the behavioral research, role-
plays and simulations to immerse students in some of the contextual 
and emotional dynamics that can influence ethical behavior, and the 
use of multimedia (especially video) that explore many of the core 
concepts in the area.46 To set a foundation for these discussions and 
exercises, before the first class of the semester I require students to 
read a summary chapter on behavioral legal ethics from Psychology
for Lawyers.47 This primer, an excellent introduction to the subject, 
sets the stage for what follows. 
Recognizing that there is only limited time per class to cover 
the core ethics curriculum, as well as to explore the insights that 
behavioral science has to offer, the second track takes place outside 
of the classroom and focuses on a companion blog created for the 
                                                                                                                
Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, 
and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 395-96 (2009). 
 45. For a short summary of this approach, see Tigran W. Eldred, Teaching 
Behavioral Ethics Across Disciplines, ETHICAL SYS. (Dec. 29, 2014), 
http://www.ethicalsystems.org/content/teaching-behavioral-ethics-across-disciplines
[https://perma.cc/CY35-AB94]. 
 46. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text. Because of time 
constraints, I try to limit discussions of the psychology of decision-making to 5-10 
minutes of the 75 minutes available per class session. So far, I have found that class 
discussions of behavioral legal ethics have not detracted in any significant way from 
teaching the doctrinal aspects of the course. 
 47. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 385-416. This chapter is 
a shorter version of their longer work, Behavioral Legal Ethics, which provides more 
extensive discussion in its footnotes of much of the primary research in the field. See 
supra note 10. The American Bar Association, which publishes PSYCHOLOGY FOR 
LAWYERS, has made this chapter available free of charge to interested law professors to 
use in their curriculum. For more information, contact the publisher. 
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course, entitled Understanding Behavioral Legal Ethics.48 Each week 
of the semester, I add one or two posts to the blog that dovetail with 
the material discussed in class. These posts allow for a deeper 
understanding of behavioral concepts, while also providing links to 
many of the core readings and additional multimedia material that 
explore the subject. In my first two years teaching in this manner, I 
decided to make participation in the blog voluntary and available for 
extra credit. If students decide to participate, they are required to 
read the blog regularly and to post at least three substantive 
comments during the semester. Some students gain additional credit 
by choosing to write a blog post on any topic relevant to behavioral 
legal ethics.49
What follows is a discussion of this approach, along with other 
suggestions for materials and methods that could complement it. 
While not every component of the course is described, I have 
attempted to provide enough detail that anyone interested would 
have a general roadmap of the approach. Nor do I attempt to cover 
all (or even most) of the social science that relates to judgment and 
decision-making—that would require its own dedicated course, if not 
more.50 Instead, as will be seen, the focus is on some of the more 
significant behavioral insights documented in the empirical research.  
                                                     
 48. This blog is created using Wordpress.com—a free, easy-to-use blogging 
program that makes it simple for anyone who is interested to create a blog. I have 
decided to make the blog private, meaning that only my students have access to it, 
which preserves student privacy and also allows for a freer discussion than might 
occur if the blog was open to public viewing. An earlier iteration of the blog was 
created on another platform, Blogger.com, which is also an easy program to use that 
is available free of charge for anyone interested in blogging. 
 49. In my most recent experience of teaching the course (Spring 2015), I 
wrote 20 blog entries on a wide variety of topics, such as blind spots, the above-
average effect, situationism, ethical fading, priming, fast thinking and conflicts of 
interest, and moral psychology, among others. For a sampling of the types of entries 
I post to the blog, see Tigran Eldred, Teaching BLE: Ethical Fading, BEHAVIORAL 
LEGAL ETHICS (Oct. 14, 2014), https://behaviorallegalethics.wordpress.com/2014/10/ 
14/teaching-ble-ethical-fading [https://perma.cc/GUF7-8MPC]. By the end of the 
semester, there were 67 comments on these entries. In addition, 13 students 
contributed their own blog entries for additional extra credit.  
 50. Excellent resources are available for teaching a law course on 
professional judgment and decision-making. See, e.g., PAUL BREST & LINDA
HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL 
JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 3 (2010); see also Joseph 
W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in 
Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 731, 749 
(2003) (advocating the use of case studies to teach students about the science of 
professional judgment and decision-making). 
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  1. Introducing Naïve Realism, Fast Thinking, and Blind Spots 
I start the semester by confronting an important psychological 
conundrum: As a general matter, people erroneously assume that 
their conscious experience is a full and accurate account of the world 
as it “really is,” without realizing the limitations of their own 
cognitive processes.51 This phenomenon, which psychologists call 
“naïve realism,”52 is so ingrained that it is the source of much 
conflict: When people disagree, they often ascribe bias to each other, 
while believing themselves to be objective.53 This form of reasoning 
presents an obvious challenge to a behavioral approach. If the goal of 
the course is to help students understand that much of their own 
ethical decision-making occurs from systematic and implicit biases, 
then the first task must be to encourage them to consider and 
confront their own misperceptions. 
My effort to address naïve realism starts in the first class, when 
we watch a video of the “Checkershadow illusion,”54 which compares 
                                                     
 51. See Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: 
Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 783 
(2004) [hereinafter Objectivity]; see also Emily Pronin et al., Understanding 
Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 26, at 636, 640 [hereinafter Understanding Misunderstanding].  
 52. See Objectivity, supra note 51, at 783; see also ROBBENNOLT &
STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 21 (“Th[e] naïve realism results in the ‘feeling that 
[our] own take on the world enjoys particular authenticity, and that other actors will, 
or at least should, share that take, if they are attentive, rational, and objective 
perceivers of reality and open-minded seekers of truth.’” (quoting Understanding 
Misunderstanding, supra note 51, at 646)); BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 50, at 
264-65 (describing the elements of naïve realism).  
 53. See Objectivity, supra note 51, at 781-83. As one expert has stated,  
If I could nominate one candidate for “biggest obstacle to world peace and social 
harmony,” it would be naïve realism because it is so easily ratcheted up from the 
individual to the group level: My group is right because we see things as they are. 
Those who disagree are obviously biased by their religion, their ideology, or their 
self-interest. Naïve realism gives us a world full of good and evil, and this brings us 
to the most disturbing implication of the sages’ advice about hypocrisy: Good and 
evil do not exist outside of our beliefs about them. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS
HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM 71 (2006). At an 
individual level, this phenomenon is known as the “false consensus effect,” which is 
the tendency people have to overestimate the degree to which others will share their 
views and to ascribe differences in opinion as evidence that others are biased by 
ideology and self-interest. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 23. 
 54. Brusspup, Incredible Shade Illusion!, YOUTUBE (Aug. 11, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z9Sen1HTu5o [https://perma.cc/CVS8-D6SS]. 
For proof that checks A and B are the same shade of gray, see Edward H. Adelson, 
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the shades of gray in checks A and B (the static version of which is 
replicated in Diagram 1).  
Diagram 1 
Many of my students seem flabbergasted—at first blush, it seems 
almost impossible to believe that checks A and B are the same shade. 
Of course, they are.55 At this point in the semester, my only goal is to 
illuminate how perception, in this case visual, can be misleading, so 
students can start to appreciate how they cannot always trust all of 
their own experiences.56 As a result, I do not press too hard, other 
than to raise the possibility that people make systematic errors in 
judgment in a wide variety of domains.57 I also emphasize how this 
                                                                                                                
Proof of Checkershadow Illusion, MIT, http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/ 
checkershadow_proof.html [https://perma.cc/F4CB-K3YQ] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 55. The scientific explanation for the checkerboard illusion involves how the 
visual system detects shades and color. Because measuring light from the surface (known 
as luminosity) is insufficient to account for effects of shadows, the mind uses tricks to 
measure and compensate for shadows—a remarkably effective system, but one that is 
also prone to error. For a full explanation, see Edward H. Adelson, Why Does the Illusion 
Work?, MIT, http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_description.html 
[https://perma.cc/F297-UBYQ ] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 56. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 26-28. 
 57. For instructors who care to engage in a more detailed classroom 
discussion of naïve realism, one excellent way might be to explore the findings by 
Dan Kahan and colleagues in their study of the videotape that the Supreme Court, in 
Scott v. Harris, said “speak[s] for itself” about whether the police used excessive 
force during and after a high-speed car chase that injured the plaintiff. 550 U.S. 372, 
378-80 n.5 (2007); see also Dan Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to 
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
837, 841 (2009). In the study, the researchers showed the videotape to 1,350 study 
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illusion reveals an important aspect of what Daniel Kahneman calls 
“fast thinking”; namely, that because these types of errors occur 
outside of conscious awareness, they cannot be eliminated simply 
through effort and deliberation.58 After all, no matter how long one 
observes checks A and B—even after learning the reasons for this 
mind trick—it is impossible not to see the two checks as different 
shades.59
I complement this lesson in my first blog entry of the semester, 
which provides additional visual illusions, as well as some short 
videos that raise important questions about our powers of perception. 
In one, the now-famous Invisible Gorilla video,60 observers are 
instructed to count how many times six people in the video pass a 
basketball between themselves; all the while, unexpectedly, a person 
in a gorilla suit walks through the video, turns to the camera, and 
thumps her chest, then exits the screen. Remarkably, almost 50% of 
the people studied who watch the video fail to see the gorilla, a 
phenomenon that researchers call “inattention[al] blindness.”61 For 
                                                                                                                
participants, most of whom agreed with the Court’s conclusion that the videotape 
revealed that the police conduct during and after the chase was justified. See id. A 
substantial number of study participants, however, disagreed with the Court’s 
conclusion, finding that the tape depicted police conduct that was unjustified. See id.
The researchers concluded that the contrast in opinions was the result of differing 
cultural worldviews, with the majority identifying more with hierarchical and 
individualist perspectives and the minority identifying more with egalitarian and 
communitarian views. See id. at 879. The videotape itself, which is available to be 
shown in class, can be used to illuminate how, contrary to the Court’s assertion, 
there are multiple reasonable interpretations of the events depicted, demonstrating 
the biasing influences of naïve realism. See id. at 895. Many other easily accessible 
materials are also available. For example, for a podcast on naïve realism focusing on 
the work of Lee Ross, the Stanford psychologist who first documented this 
phenomenon, see David McRaney, Naïve Realism, YOU ARE NOT SO SMART (Nov. 
9, 2015), http://youarenotsosmart.com/2015/11/09/yanss-062-why-you-often-believe-
people-who-see-the-world-differently-are-wrong [https://perma.cc/9NAJ-XWNM]. 
 58. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 13, 28. This is not to say that 
conscious deliberation cannot lessen the influence of some unconscious aspects of 
decision-making. See, e.g., infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text. 
 59. For instructors who want to explore visual illusions in greater detail, 
including what they reveal about the relationship between automatic and deliberative 
processes of thinking, see KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 26-27 (describing the 
Müller-Lyer illusion); id. at 100-01 (describing the 3-D Heuristic). 
 60. For anyone who has not seen it, I suggest they stop reading now and watch 
the video. See Daniel Simons, Selective Attention Test, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo [https://perma.cc/D8ZZ-5X4D]. 
 61. See CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA:
HOW OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US 6-7 (1st ed. 2009) [hereinafter Invisible Gorilla].
For the original study, see Daniel Simons & Christopher Chabris, Gorillas in Our 
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my purposes, the video reveals two points: First, people generally 
overlook what they do not expect to see, even when it is prominently 
displayed right in front of them;62 and second, most people are 
unaware of—that is, are blind to—the limits of their own attention.63
After watching the video, I ask my students to ponder this question: 
If our minds can be so easily tricked through visual illusions and 
videos revealing inattention blindness, then in what other ways are 
we blind to aspects of our own experience?64
At this early stage of the course, my hope is that the class 
discussion and blog have raised student interest in the idea that 
lawyers can fail to perceive important aspects of their own reality, 
such as their own (and others’) misbehavior. The rest of the semester 
                                                                                                                
Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059, 
1066-73 (1999). Instructors might assign students this interesting NPR interview on 
the study: Bet You Didn’t Notice ‘The Invisible Gorilla’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 
19, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126977945 
[https://perma.cc/D2AR-QYAS]. 
 62. See CHABRIS & SIMONS, supra note 61, at 6-7 (“When people devote 
their attention to a particular area or aspect of their visual world, they tend not to 
notice unexpected objects, even when those unexpected objects are salient, 
potentially important, and appear right where we are looking.”). 
 63. As Chabris & Simons state, “The gorilla study illustrates, perhaps more 
dramatically than any other, the powerful and pervasive influence of the illusion of 
attention: We experience far less of our visual world than we think we do.” Id. at 7. The 
authors conducted a survey to document the effect, finding that 75% of people thought 
they would notice an unexpected event that occurred in front of their eyes, even if they 
were focusing on something else. Id. The study, which reveals that 50% of the 
participants failed to see the gorilla, demonstrates the power of this illusion. Id. at 6. 
 64. See, e.g., Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable, supra note 34, at 
514-15 (discussing how corporate lawyers can misperceive risk, just as study 
participants missed seeing the invisible gorilla). To reinforce this point, I post a 
second blog entry, entitled “A Few Bad Apples or Something Else,” which raises the 
question of whether most ethical transgressions are the result of intentional 
misbehavior or more subtle forms of misconduct. In it, I discuss briefly the case of 
Bernie Madoff, who might be described as the proverbial “bad apple” for his 
persistent and intentional misconduct, and then ask the students whether this form of 
misbehavior best describes most misconduct that occurs. Then I link to Professor 
Leslie Levin’s well-written book review, which surveys psychological research to 
make the point that, rather than a few bad apples, much of lawyer misbehavior 
results from subtle and unconscious forms of ethical lapses. See Levin, supra note 
12, at 1552-53, 1583. This post ends with a video from Ethics Unwrapped, entitled 
“Bounded Ethicality,” which raises some of the same points. See UT McCombs 
School of Business, Bound Ethicality, YOUTUBE (Nov. 11, 2012), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=yDXLzz2144g [https://perma.cc/CTD6-49R4]. 
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expands on these themes by focusing on specific aspects of 
behavioral science that relate to the law of lawyering.65
 2. Situationism 
In the weeks that follow, our substantive class discussions turn 
to the bar’s licensing procedures,66 the duty to report misconduct,67
and managerial and subordinate responsibility for unethical 
behavior.68 These are perfect opportunities to introduce and discuss 
the body of research known as “situationism,” which explores the 
tremendous yet subtle power that situational variables can have on 
how people think and behave.69
The classroom discussion starts with the bar’s licensing 
requirement, which directly poses the question of whether and how 
the profession should assess the moral character of its applicants—a 
topic that naturally raises a common fallacy in reasoning known as 
“the fundamental attribution error” (FAE). In a nutshell, the FAE 
describes the established tendency to overestimate the predictive 
value of personality and disposition, while undervaluing the power 
                                                     
 65. As may be evident, my approach does not seek to delve deeply into the 
underlying psychological explanations for why people make biased judgments based 
on limited information. An instructor could certainly do so, for example, by 
exploring how humans rely on scripts, schemas, stereotypes, and other short hands 
in their perception and construal of experience. I have decided, however, that too 
much detail on the foundations of social cognition early in the semester might 
sidetrack our discussions. For those who do want to explore these matters in more 
depth, excellent resources are available. See, e.g., SUSAN FISKE & SHELLEY TAYLOR,
SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 32-58 (2013). For easily accessible 
summaries of similar material, see, for example, ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra
note 29, at 7-27. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay 
for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569, 1569-97 (2000).  
 66. Most course books provide a good description of the licensing and 
admission process, including the one that I use: LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G.
SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 52-77 (3d ed. 2012). 
 67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).  
 68. Id. R. 5.1-5.2. 
69. See JOHN DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY & MORAL 
BEHAVIOR 1-2, 23-26 (2002); see also ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 39, at 3-5. For an 
ongoing in-depth discussion of situationism and its relationship to various areas of 
the law, see The Situationist, https://thesituationist.wordpress.com/about/ [https:// 
perma.cc/EEN2-M4NK] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016), which is associated with the 
Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School. See The Situationist,
https://thesituationist.wordpress.com/about-plsps-at-harvard-law-school [https://perma. 
cc/2DZY-B7QG] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
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of situational forces, in explaining behavior.70 The bar’s focus on 
moral character is a classic example: By presuming that an 
applicant’s past behavior is predictive of a particular disposition that 
suggests future conduct, the process fails to account for the 
situational variables that are highly influential in how decisions are 
made.71 As with naïve realism, because I expect my students to 
possess assumptions about the preeminence of character over 
situational forces, I do not try to lecture them away from their 
beliefs. Rather, I simply identify the error in class and mention that 
there is a rich body of empirical research demonstrating it as a means 
to raise situationism as a topic. 
Now that we have started to think about situationism, we are 
ready to start a more substantive discussion. There are many ways to 
address these issues. Two that naturally fit into the curriculum are 
the influences of conformity and obedience on decision-making. 
                                                     
 70. See DORIS, supra note 69, at 92-97; see also ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 
39, at 125-33. Many legal ethicists have also written about the power of the FAE, 
including W. Bradley Wendel. See W. Bradley Wendel, Stephen Glass, Situational 
Forces, and the Fundamental Attribution Error, 4 J. L. 99, 99 (2014); see also 
Perlman, supra note 41, at 453; Alice Woolley, Legal Ethics and Regulatory 
Legitimacy: Regulating Lawyers for Personal Misconduct, in ALTERNATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS 241-69 (Francesca Bartlett ed., 2010); 
Deborah Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 
555-59 (1985). Professor David Luban has an interesting perspective on the FAE, 
wondering whether social psychologists have placed too much emphasis on the power 
of the situation to overcome individual variations based on character. See David 
Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 293-98 (2003). But 
see Perlman, supra note 41, at 468 n.103 (arguing that Professor Luban overstates the 
situationist perspective, in that situationism does not posit that individuals have no 
power to resist contextual influences, but instead “that dispositional traits are far less 
important than most people realize and that context is a much more significant 
determinant of human behavior than people typically believe”). See also DORIS, supra 
note 69, at 23-26 (describing the nuanced situationist perspective that takes into 
account individual variation); Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and 
Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065, 1071-75 (2010) (discussing the 
interplay between situational variables and personality traits). 
 71. Deborah Rhode first made this point thirty years ago, while others have 
done so more recently. See Rhode, supra note 70, at 556-58; Leslie Levin, The Folly 
of Expecting Evil: Reconsidering the Bar’s Character and Fitness Requirement,
2014 BYU L. REV. 775, 777-78 (2014); see also Alice Woolley, Tending the Bar: 
The “Good Character” Requirement for Law Society Admission, 30 DALHOUSIE L.J. 
27, 37-41 (2007) (discussing the important role of situational variables in assessing 
Canada’s good moral character assessment). 
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The role of conformity arises naturally in our discussion of the 
duty to report misconduct under Model Rule 8.3.72 As we start to 
discuss this topic, I ask the students why this rule is so often 
violated.73 Typically, students state that reporting a colleague’s 
misbehavior might risk their jobs or endanger their reputations by 
casting them as disloyal members of the legal community. In other 
words, they believe that their decision on whether to report another’s 
misbehavior would be triggered by a conscious cost-benefit 
calculation derived from rational decision-making. Few of my 
students, however, indicate that their resistance may be due to the 
subtle pressures to conform to group norms. 
At this point, I introduce the famous research by psychologist 
Solomon Asch, who demonstrated more than fifty years ago the 
tremendous power of group pressure.74 In his research, Asch 
explored the conditions under which an individual would conform to 
the consensus, even when the group’s opinion is obviously wrong. 
The most well-known variation of his study is beautiful in its 
simplicity: A number of participants sat in a row, were shown two 
cards such as in Diagram 2, and then were asked to declare which 
line on the second card (A, B, or C) was the same height as the line 
on the first card.75 The answer, of course, is obvious. 
                                                     
 72. The rule requires “[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects” to “inform the appropriate professional authority.” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a). Confidential information is excluded from the 
obligation. See id. R. 8.3(c). 
 73. See Perlman, supra note 41, at 475 (“Rule 8.3 . . . is rarely enforced. 
The vast majority of states do not have a single reported case where a lawyer was 
disciplined under this rule.”). 
 74. See Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31, 
32 (1955). For other descriptions of the Asch experiments, see Rapoport, supra note 
37, at 62-63. See also ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 133-34;
O’Grady, supra note 40, at 18-19; Perlman, supra note 41, at 453-56. 
 75. See Asch, supra note 74, at 32. 
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Diagram 2 
It turns out, however, that only one of the participants was 
actually the true subject of the study; the other participants were 
Asch’s confederates who surreptitiously had been instructed to 
provide the wrong answer at designated times.76 The study thus 
created an easy way to measure the degree to which subjects would 
be willing to succumb to or defy mounting pressure to join the group 
consensus.77
Rather than lecturing on Asch’s methodology, I find it more 
effective to show my students Diagram 2 and ask which two lines are 
identical. Everyone answers correctly, as expected. Then I ask them 
to declare whether their answers would change if, prior to answering, 
they learned that all of their classmates had provided the wrong 
answer. No one tends to believe that the conduct of others would 
matter. We then watch a short video of the Asch study, which 
demonstrates a replication of his experiment in action and discusses 
many of its findings—including that 36.8% of the subjects in Asch’s 
experiment conformed to the majority’s view.78 Perhaps even more 
startling, while many of the subjects did resist the majority pressure 
on one or more of the rounds, ultimately over 75% of them 
                                                     
 76. The subject had been told that the experiment was a vision test, whereas 
the confederates—who were secretly working with the experimenter—knew that its 
true purpose was to measure the power of conformity. Procedurally, the experiment 
involved multiple rounds in which the participants were shown two cards. In each 
round, a new set of cards with lines of different heights would be used. In the initial 
rounds, the confederates were instructed to provide correct answers so as to maintain 
the illusion that they were true participants in the study, but at a designated point in 
later rounds, as instructed, they provided incorrect answers. See id.
 77. See id. at 32-33. 
 78. Id.
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conformed to the majority at least once.79 I explain that these results 
have been replicated in a multitude of studies since.80
The Asch study raises many points for discussion. For 
example, one of the most startling is that so many participants 
conformed, even though there was no penalty for failing to do so.81
This raises the question of what would happen if, in a different 
situation, a person had a much greater incentive to conform to the 
group—for example, the fear of losing one’s job. It also produces a 
natural opportunity to discuss another finding from the studies: that 
the power to conform diminishes substantially when variables of the 
situation change.82 For example, when unanimity is broken by at least 
one other participant who also does not conform, the level of 
conformity by the subject plummets.83 An instructor can also explore 
the psychological explanations for conformity, for example, by 
discussing that some of Asch’s participants, when confronted with a 
group consensus, questioned the accuracy of their own perceptions, 
while others knew that they had been accurate and that the group was 
wrong, yet conformed anyway so as not to “spoil the results” of the 
experiment.84
                                                     
 79. See id. at 35; see also Perlman, supra note 41, at 455. I use a short video clip 
of the Asch experiments introduced by famed social psychologist Philip Zimbardo. See
HeroicImaginationTV, Asch Conformity Experiment, YOUTUBE (Feb. 19, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NyDDyT1lDhA [https://perma.cc/YJ8J-P79V]. A 
longer version of the video is available from NBC Dateline, which ran a segment in 1987 
called “Follow the Leader.” See Kobe Bryant, Follow the Leader, YOUTUBE (July 23,
2013) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ME4lOsQzcIE [https://perma.cc/L7YE-
UGH2]. See generally S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and 
Distortion of Judgment, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN (H. Guetzkow ed., 1951). 
 80. See generally Rod Bond & Peter Smith, Culture and Conformity: A 
Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 111, 111 (1996) (describing the many replications and variations of 
the Asch experiments in 17 different countries and discussing some of the cultural 
and other variables that influence the degree of conformity). 
 81. See DAVID MYERS, EXPLORING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 159 (6th ed. 2012). 
 82. See Perlman, supra note 41, at 455.  
83. See Asch, supra note 74, at 35. As one author has noted, “Asch found that 
the introduction of certain variables dramatically affected conformity levels. For example 
. . . conformity fell by more than 50% in most variations of the experiment when one of 
the confederates dissented from the group opinion.” Perlman, supra note 41, at 455. 
 84. See Asch, supra note 74, at 33. These differing explanations are examples 
of what psychologists call “informational” conformity, which occurs when someone 
accepts another’s views as more accurate than their own, and “normative” conformity, 
which occurs when someone conforms out of desire for social approval or acceptance 
from others. See Michael A. Hogg, Influence and Leadership, in HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1166, 1182 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010). 
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Incorporating research on conformity enriches the discussion of 
Model Rule 8.3. After discussing the Asch results, many of my 
students seem more willing to acknowledge the possibility that they, 
too, might conform to group pressure by not reporting misconduct. 
We also discuss how group pressure might be countered, for 
example, by changing the dynamics of the situation such as seeking 
out colleagues who also are willing to speak up and report 
misconduct.85 Finally, I cap off this discussion with two quick 
examples of conformity in action. The first is the hilarious scene in 
an elevator from the TV show, Candid Camera, which should not be 
missed.86 The second is from the movie, The Matrix, which provides 
a nice metaphor for how unseen situational forces can influence 
behavior.87
After discussing conformity pressures, we shift to Model Rule 
5.2—the rule that places individual responsibility on subordinate 
attorneys to make their own ethical judgments even when confronted 
with pressures to obey superiors.88 I start this discussion by asking 
whether students believe it will be easy to escape pressures they may 
feel from their supervisors to act in a manner that is unethical. This 
primes the discussion for the one of most well-known experiments in 
social psychology: Stanley Milgram’s famous studies on obedience.89
                                                     
 85. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. 
 86. This video is available from many sources, including Peer Pressure on 
the Elevator – Video, MANIAC WORLD, http://www.maniacworld.com/peer-pressure-
on-the-elevator.html [https://perma.cc/9JZK-T82D] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 87. See THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999). For the uninitiated, The Matrix
tells of how humankind lives unknowingly tethered to a central computer that 
generates false impressions of reality. I suggest to my students that they, too, are living 
in a form of a matrix, but one of social construction. They do not believe me until I 
issue this simple challenge: Will anyone be willing to stand up in class and disrobe? Of 
course, I do not want anyone to do so (and none have so far!), but after a brief chuckle 
the point is made—we all behave in large measure based on unstated social norms that 
form a type of matrix that tends to cause people, even those who perceive themselves 
as highly individual, to conform to subtle and often invisible social forces, such as the 
deep-seated norm against public nudity (I borrowed this simple demonstration from 
Professor Jonathan Haidt of NYU’s Stern School of Business). 
 88. The rule states that “[a] lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person,” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a), but then adds that “[a] subordinate 
lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in 
accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable 
question of professional duty.” Id. R. 5.2(b). 
 89. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: THE EXPERIMENT 
THAT CHALLENGED HUMAN NATURE (1974). These famous experiments have been 
discussed extensively in legal ethics literature. See, e.g., O’Grady, supra note 40, at 14-
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Setting up this discussion is rather easy, as many students are 
already familiar with Milgram’s work from their undergraduate days. 
To start, I explain the methodology of the classic experiment in 
which subjects (the “teachers”) were instructed by the experimenter 
to provide increasingly severe electric shocks to other participants 
(the “learners”), who were attached by electrodes to a “shock 
machine,” whenever the learner provided an incorrect answer posed 
by the teacher.90 As with the Asch experiment, the real purpose of 
Milgram’s study, in this case to assess the power of obedience to 
induce unethical behavior, was hidden from the teachers, who did 
not know that the learners were confederates of the study and were 
pretending to receive shocks that were not, in fact, administered. We 
then watch a short video that shows many of the original study 
participants in action, such as those who giggle nervously as they 
administer what they believe to be shocks of increasing voltage, or 
those who turn to the experimenter to ask whether they should 
continue to administer these shocks even after the learner has 
apparently lost consciousness.91
There are many aspects of the Milgram results worth exploring. 
The most jarring is the final tally: More than 60% of the participants 
in Milgram’s classic study were willing to administer severe (and 
potentially lethal) shocks in excess of 450 volts, even when the 
learner seemed to have lost consciousness, revealing in stark terms 
the power that obedience seems to possess to produce unethical 
behavior.92 I also mention a point that we return to repeatedly in 
                                                                                                                
16; Perlman, supra note 41, at 455-58; Kim, supra note 43, at 992-95; David J. Luban, 
The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 94, 96-97 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). 
 90. See MILGRAM, supra note 89, at 60. The shock machine used in the 
experiment indicated the danger levels for the amount of voltage administered. For 
example, in bold red letters, the machine labeled between 300-375 volts as 
“EXTREME INTENSITY SHOCK”; between 375-435 volts as “DANGER: 
SEVERE SHOCK,” and above 420 volts as “XXX.” See id. For further descriptions 
of Milgram’s methodology, see O’Grady, supra note 40, at 14-16. See also Perlman, 
supra note 41, at 456-59. 
 91. The video of the Milgram experiments is available for purchase. See
The Stanley Milgram Films on Social Psychology, ALEXANDER STREET,
http://alexanderstreet.com/products/stanley-milgram-films-social-psychology [https:// 
perma.cc/C7AQ-QVR8] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). Shorter clips of the 
experiments, which can be used for classroom discussions, are widely available. See, 
e.g., LiveWord?, Milgram Obedience Study, YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCVlI-_4GZQ [https://perma.cc/93A9-PLG2]. 
 92. See MILGRAM, supra note 89. As Professor Rhode has noted, “Stanley 
Milgram’s classic electric shock experiments offer a chilling reminder of how readily 
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various points in the semester: the power of incrementalism.93 One 
reason why the teachers in the Milgram experiments were willing to 
administer increasingly severe shocks was that each addition in 
voltage was only a slight increase from the previous amount 
administered—making it easier for each succeeding increase in 
electricity to seem less severe than if there had been a substantial 
jump in voltage from one shock to the next.94 The lesson is that small 
ethical transgressions can transform quickly into bigger ones, often 
without conscious awareness that it is happening.95 Bringing these 
points back to Model Rule 5.2, we discuss how subordinate attorneys 
may be induced into misbehavior due to subtle and pernicious 
influences when following the commands of superiors, much like the 
conduct of the teachers in Milgram’s experiments.96
                                                                                                                
the good go bad if someone in a seemingly legitimate decision making position 
demands it.” Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1322-
23 (2006); see also BLASS, supra note 39, at xviii (“Milgram’s obedience experiments 
taught us—dramatically—that, in a concrete situation containing powerful social 
pressures, our moral sense can readily get trampled underfoot.”). However, it should 
be noted that there remains, more than fifty years after the Milgram experiments, a 
robust discussion about the extent to which blind obedience can be compelled by an 
authority figure, with a number of commentators calling for renewed research to 
answer unresolved questions. See, e.g., Stephen D. Reicher et al., What Makes a 
Person a Perpetrator? The Intellectual, Moral, and Methodological Arguments for 
Revisiting Milgram’s Research on the Influence of Authority, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 393 
(2014). Any instructor who plans to teach this material should become familiar with 
this discussion. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. 
 93. Research demonstrates that it is easier for people to engage in unethical 
behavior incrementally—that is, by gradually increasing the severity of infractions 
over time—rather than abruptly and all at once. See, e.g., David T. Welsh et al., The 
Slippery Slope: How Small Ethical Transgressions Pave the Way for Larger Future 
Transgressions, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 114 (2015); Francesca Gino et al., How
Unethical Behavior Becomes Habit, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/09/how-unethical-behavior-becomes-habit [https://perma.cc/ 
4KP5-EQ62]. Similarly, it is easier to accept unethical behavior of others that occurs 
incrementally rather than abruptly. See Francesca Gino & Max H. Bazerman, When 
Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The Acceptability of Gradual Erosion in Others’ 
Unethical Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 708 (2009). 
 94. See Jerry M. Burger, Situational Features in Milgram’s Experiment That 
Kept His Participants Shocking, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 489, 491-93 (2014); Welsh et al., 
supra note 93, at 116; Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey 
Today?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 3 (2009); Steven J. Gilbert, Another Look at the 
Milgram Obedience Studies: The Role of the Gradated Series of Shocks, 7 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 690, 691-92 (1981); Luban, supra note 70, at 286-87. 
 95. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text. 
 96. A number of other aspects of the Milgram experiments relevant to legal 
ethics can also be explored. For example, the responsibility of the teachers in the 
study was diffused by the experimenter, who stated that he would be responsible for 
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Before leaving our discussion of situationism, I want the 
students to realize that many other subtle variations in a situation can 
have profound implications on moral behavior. To make this point, 
on the class blog I post a summary of some of the research on 
priming97 that has been most pertinent to ethical decision-making. I 
also include links to some of the more interesting research on 
situationism, including many subtle contextual variables that can 
influence the likelihood that someone will cheat.98 My point here is 
not to tie this research to any particular type of judgment lawyers 
make, but rather to ask the students to start thinking about how subtle 
and often overlooked variables in the environment in which they will 
work may play a significant, if unexpected, role in the types of 
ethical choices they will confront in practice. It also gets them 
                                                                                                                
any harm that occurred to the learners—revealing how diffusion of responsibility 
can facilitate unethical behavior. See Burger, Replicating Milgram, supra note 94, at 
3-4; see also Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1149 (explaining how 
diffusion of responsibility can loosen restraints against unethical conduct by 
lawyers). An instructor may also want to emphasize that lawyers in positions of 
authority should be made aware of the power that they possess to influence the 
ethical behavior of their subordinates and others. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 29, at 136.  
 97. “Priming” is a broad category that refers to the influence that 
unconscious stimuli can have on a person’s perceptions, interpretations, and 
behavior. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 11. For example, on 
the blog I describe and cite to research indicating that the mere exposure to the idea 
of money is more likely to induce the types of thinking that produce unethical 
behavior. See Francesca Gino & Cassie Mogilner, Time, Money, and Morality, 25 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 414, 414-16 (2014); Maryam Kouchaki et al., Seeing Green: Mere 
Exposure to Money Triggers a Business Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes,
121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 53 (2013). In contrast, 
priming people to think about time rather than money can produce more charitable 
and ethical behavior. See Gino & Mogilner, supra, at 414-16.
 98. For example, I link to an essay in the New Yorker magazine that 
describes many of the subtle situational variables—such as the lighting or messiness 
of the environment or whether someone is in a position of power or is mentally 
fatigued—that have been documented to affect the degree to which people cheat. 
See Maria Konnikova, Inside the Cheater’s Mind, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/inside-the-cheaters-mind [https://perma.cc/ 
H3VE-VSWK]. I also refer the students to the Situationist Blog, supra note 69, 
which contains a treasure trove of material on situationism. Its founder, Jon Hansen, 
has been one of the leading scholars addressing the power of situational factors on 
legal doctrine and reasoning. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1 (2004); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to 
the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003). 
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thinking about topics that might serve as the basis for their own blog 
posts later in the semester. 
By this point in the semester, my hope is that many of the 
students have started to question whether merely learning the rules of 
ethical conduct, even with an optimistic intent to follow them, will 
be sufficient to ensure ethical behavior. If I have been successful, the 
students are more cautious in assuming that they will never be 
subject to the influences and pressures that we have so far discussed. 
The next step is to turn to some of the subtle psychological factors 
that make it easy for everyone to engage in biased reasoning in 
decision-making. 
 3. Biased Reasoning 
There is so much literature on heuristics and cognitive biases 
that it would require at least an entire semester dedicated solely to 
this material to cover it. Of course, we have much less time, so I 
limit our discussions to only a few of the ways people are 
unconsciously influenced in making decisions. Two of the most 
important are confirmation bias and the related concept of motivated 
reasoning. The power of confirmation bias, a ubiquitous and well-
documented phenomenon, causes people unconsciously to seek out, 
interpret, and remember information in a manner that confirms 
previously held beliefs.99 Motivated reasoning, a slightly different 
concept that is also well-documented, refers to the power of 
motivation to influence this filtering process; that is, people not only 
seek to confirm preexisting beliefs, but also seek to reaffirm their 
preexisting wishes, wants, and desires.100
To teach this material, again I find demonstrations helpful. At 
the beginning of our segment on confidentiality, I ask my students to 
self-report on a scale of 1-10 the importance they place on 
confidentiality as a value that lawyers should possess. The reported 
rate is quite high, usually between 9 and 10. 
                                                     
99. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 11-14; Raymond S. 
Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV.
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).  
 100. For seminal work in motivated reasoning, see Ziva Kunda, The Case for 
Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990). See also Pronin et al., 
Objectivity, supra note 51, at 781-99. I have described the power of confirmation 
bias and motivated reasoning elsewhere. See Eldred, Motivation Matters, supra note 
35, at 492-98; Eldred, Ethical Blindness, supra note 35, at 362-65. 
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Next, I administer a variation of the famous Wason Selection 
Test, one of the foundational studies documenting the power of 
confirmatory reasoning.101 The test is quite simple. I show the 
students four cards of the type used by Wason (see Diagram 3) and 
pose this hypothetical: If there is an “A” on one side of the card, 
then there is a “3” on the other side of the card. Then, I assign this 
task: Which two cards would you turn over to test the accuracy of 
this hypothesis? 
Diagram 3
A

D 3 7
After a short time for consideration, I ask for results. Most 
students report that they would turn over the “A” and the “3,” a 
common but erroneous response.102 We then discuss why. As Wason 
demonstrated, when confronted with a hypothesis, most people seek 
to confirm it by looking for examples where it is true. The problem 
with this form of reasoning is that no matter how many positive 
examples are found, there is always the possibility that in one 
instance it may be false. As a result, when considering any 
hypothesis, the only way to determine its accuracy is to investigate 
whether there are any instances in which it is false, rather than 
seeking out examples where it is true. The correct answer, therefore, 
is to turn over the cards with the facing “A” and “7.”103
                                                     
 101. Peter Wason, Reasoning About a Rule, 20 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 273 (1968); see also JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY 
GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 42-43 (2012) (discussing the 
Wason selection task). 
 102. Erica Dawson et al., Motivated Reasoning and Performance on the 
Wason Selection Task, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379, 1380 (2002) 
(reporting the success rate on the task at approximately 20%). 
 103. Once instructed, and after a short reflection, most students realize that if 
there is a number other than a “3” on the opposite side of the card with the facing 
“A,” then the hypothesis is false; likewise, if there is an “A” on the opposite side of 
the card with the facing “7,” then again the hypothesis has been proved false. In 
contrast, turning over the card with the facing “3” is inconsequential: If there is an 
“A” on the other side, it only reveals an example where the hypothesis is true, but 
does not prove that the hypothesis is true; and if there is a letter other than an “A” on 
the other side of the card with the facing “3,” then no useful information is 
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So what does this have to do with confidentiality? I suggest to 
my students quite a lot. For example, when we discuss permissive 
disclosure of otherwise confidential information under Model Rule 
1.6(b),104 I ask whether they think they will be swayed in favor of 
protecting confidentiality by interpreting the rules narrowly due to 
the high value they have previously placed on protecting client 
confidences.105 After experiencing the Wason test, my hope is that 
they will start to appreciate how their preexisting views might shape 
their future judgments.106 I must admit, however, that most students 
seem skeptical that they will be influenced by their unconscious bias 
in favor of confirmatory information; instead, they seem inclined to 
believe that they will be able to consider each situation objectively— 
perhaps not a surprise given the strength of naïve realism.107
This perspective, however, seems to change once I introduce 
the science of motivated reasoning. To do so, again I use a 
                                                                                                                
obtained—after all, the hypothesis is that “If there is an A on one side, there is a 3 
on the other,” not “If there is a 3 on one side, there is an A on the other.” Finally, 
turning over the card with the facing “D” provides no useful information. For a 
deeper discussion of the Wason selection task, including explorations of the factors 
that reduce the power of confirmatory reasoning, see Thomas D. Gilovich & Dale 
W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 84, at 547-48. 
 104. The rule sets forth a series of limited circumstances in which a lawyer is 
allowed, but not required, to disclose what otherwise would be deemed confidential 
information. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1983). These include the conclusion that disclosure is reasonably necessary “to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,” and “to prevent the 
client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance 
of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.” Id. R. 1.6(b)(1)-(2). 
 105. See supra p. 26 (noting that students rate the duty of confidentiality as 
quite important, in the range of 9 out of 10). 
 106. There are many other experiential ways to teach the power of 
confirmatory reasoning, including another famous test developed by Peter Wason, 
entitled the “2-4-6 induction task,” which asks subjects to discover a rule involving 
three numbers by inviting and then receiving feedback on subsequent sequences of 
three numbers. See Peter Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a 
Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129, 130 (1960). Instructors can 
easily adapt the test, which demonstrates how easy it is for participants to seek out 
information that confirms preexisting hypotheses, to the classroom environment. See
Podcast: Professor Eldred and Behavioral Legal Ethics, NEW ENG. L. REV. (Apr.
23, 2015), https://newenglrev.com/2015/04/23/podcast-professor-eldred-and-behavioral-
legal-ethics [https://perma.cc/7WJK-TBBK]. For a video demonstration of this 
exercise, see Veritasium, Can You Solve This?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKA4w2O61Xo [https://perma.cc/H2L2-8MFJ]. 
 107. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
 Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics 785 
demonstration, this time from materials created by Dan Kahan, a 
leading scholar on the ways in which motivated reasoning influences 
decision-making. Based on his study entitled They Saw A Protest,108
which is a modern-day update of one of the classic studies in social 
psychology,109 I show the students a video of a street protest of the 
military’s now defunct “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in front of a 
military recruitment office and then ask them to decide, silently and 
to themselves, whether the protest should be protected free speech 
under the First Amendment.110 Then I tell them that I am going to 
show them another video of a protest, but this time one outside an 
abortion clinic111 and, once again, they are to decide for themselves 
whether they believe the protest is protected free speech. We then 
watch the exact same video as before.112 In our discussion, I ask if 
anyone experienced any shift in personal opinion about whether the 
protest should be protected based on the type of protest they had 
seen. Many students report that they experienced some shift; in other 
words, their own response differed based on knowing what type of 
activity was being protested, even though the activity observed was 
exactly the same. We conclude by briefly discussing the results of 
Professor Kahan’s study, which documented how perception of 
legally relevant facts—here, for example, the conduct of the 
                                                     
 108. Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and 
the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012). 
 109. See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case 
Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). In this study, the researchers 
measured the extent to which observers of a football game between Dartmouth and 
Princeton ascribed aggressive and improper play to the two teams. See id. at 130. 
The study concluded that the affiliation of the observer—that is, whether he was a 
student at the school of either team—played a substantial role in the observer’s 
construal of the events of the game. See id. at 133; see also BREST & KRIEGER, supra
note 50, at 245-46 (describing the study). For a fuller description of the study and its 
application to partisanship in a legal context, see Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and 
Independence, supra note 44, at 7-12. 
 110. See Kahan et al., supra note 108, at 870 & n.87. The video is still 
available. Videoreview12, Recruit_Center_11192010, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3PJACpL53k [https://perma.cc/87ZL-6FB6].  
 111. See Kahan et al., supra note 108, at 870 & n.87. The video is still 
available. Videoreview12, Abortion Clinic 11 22 2010, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8ru-FE2v_8 [https://perma.cc/7HLU-9CQQ]. 
 112. The videos depict conduct that is sufficiently ambiguous so that 
different reasonable interpretations are possible about whether the conduct is 
protected speech.  
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protestors—is influenced by the perceiver’s preexisting cultural 
values.113
After this demonstration, I take a step back and explain that 
there are “literally file cabinets” of data documenting the power of 
motivated reasoning.114 In each of these studies, the point is 
essentially the same: People tend to seek out and interpret 
information based on their preconceived desires.115 For example, 
people tend to scrutinize more carefully information that is 
inconsistent with their preferences than they do information that is 
compatible with their wants. As one expert has noted, when 
evaluating whether to believe favorable information, people tend to 
ask themselves an easy question, “Can I believe this?”—whereas 
when considering the reliability of unfavorable information, they ask 
a much more demanding question, “Must I believe this?”116 And, as 
with all cognitive biases, these processes occur outside of conscious 
awareness, meaning people do not perceive the asymmetric ways in 
which their desires influence how they consume information.117
We then circle back to confidentiality. For example, we discuss 
how in many instances the confidentiality rules provide lawyers with 
a competitive advantage over other professions that do not similarly 
                                                     
 113. See Kahan et al., supra note 108, at 883-94. In a recent and quite 
important study, Dan Kahan and his colleagues have found evidence that judges and 
lawyers (but not law students) are immune to the type of cultural cognition 
documented in his earlier work. See Dan Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation 
Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional 
Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349 (2016). For a discussion of this study and its 
application to behavioral legal ethics, see infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text. 
 114. HAIDT, supra note 101, at 98. There are many interesting ways to 
highlight motivated reasoning, such as, the biased ways that people seek out and 
consume the news. See John McCormick, Liberals and Conservatives Consume 
News Differently, Study Finds, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 21, 2014, 7:46 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-21/liberals-and-conservatives-
consume-news-differently-study-finds [https://perma.cc/5YW2-TB4B]. 
 115. As I have noted elsewhere, “[C]onsiderable evidence indicates that 
people frame questions in ways that favor their beliefs; search their memory and 
other sources for favorable information and then truncate their search once it is 
found; tend to perceive ambiguous information in a manner that is consistent with 
preferences; and evaluate favorable information less rigorously than unfavorable 
information.” Eldred, Motivation Matters, supra note 35, at 495. 
 116. Dawson et al., supra note 102, 1379-80; THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE
KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 31-
37 (1991). 
 117. See GILOVICH, supra note 116. 
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promise such protections118 and how, therefore, self-interest in 
protecting confidential information might cause lawyers to narrowly 
interpret the rules regarding permissive disclosure.119 Armed with our 
recent discussion of motivated reasoning, my hope is that at least 
some of my students will start to realize that their perceptions of 
their own objectivity might be belied by their all-too-human 
tendencies to seek out and interpret information in a self-serving 
manner.120
We end our discussion of confirmation bias and motivated 
reasoning in class by recognizing that its applicability is far from 
limited to confidentiality. Rather, I ask the students to consider how 
many of the ethics rules can be interpreted in a self-serving manner, 
raising the possibility that as lawyers they will need to consider how 
their ethical choices can be captured by the fallibility of reasoning 
that we all possess. 
 4. Bounded Ethicality 
By the middle of the semester, my hope is that the students 
have developed a basic understanding of what psychologists have 
started to call “bounded ethicality.” The general idea is that we are 
                                                     
 118. See Fred C. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes: Are Lawyers 
Rational Actors?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 693 n.95 (2010) (“By allowing 
lawyers to promise secrecy, confidentiality rules provide lawyers with a competitive 
advantage over accountants and other service providers who cannot do the same”); 
Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in 
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 599 (1989) 
(describing why the confidentiality rules are in the legal profession’s self-interest). 
119. See DEBORAH RHODE & GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 94 (2d ed. 2007) (“Social psychology research 
confirms what common sense and common experience suggest. People have a 
natural inclination to conflate what is personally advantageous with what is socially 
just and ethically justifiable.”). For description of the research documenting how 
self-interest produces automatic motivated reasoning, see Eldred, Ethical Blindness,
supra note 35, at 361-68.  
 120. As one author has observed, “One of the core teachings of behavioral ethics 
research is that it is not just difficult, but impossible, to be truly objective about a decision 
when you have a significant interest in the outcome.” Scott Killingsworth, “C” is for 
Crucible: Behavioral Ethics, Culture, and the Board’s Role in C-Suite Compliance, in 
CULTURE, COMPLIANCE, AND THE C-SUITE: HOW EXECUTIVES, BOARDS, AND 
POLICYMAKERS BETTER SAFEGUARD AGAINST MISCONDUCT AT THE TOP 53 (Michael D. 
Greenberg ed., 2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/ 
CF300/CF316/RAND_CF316.pdf [https://perma.cc/STH8-SRAW]; see also O’Grady, 
supra note 14, at 685 (“Nothing obscures objective decision making more directly than 
having a vested personal interest or stake in an outcome.”). 
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often unaware of the reasons that we violate our own preferred 
ethical principles—or to put it another way, why it is so easy to 
deceive ourselves into thinking we are more ethical than we are in 
reality.121 To emphasize this point further, and to delve deeper into 
the psychology involved, I next focus on two particular aspects of 
the bounded nature of ethical decision-making. 
a. Overconfidence Bias and Conflicts of Interest 
The first is generally known as overconfidence bias, a well-
documented phenomenon that describes the ways in which everyone, 
lawyers included, tend to overestimate their own abilities regarding a 
variety of positive traits, including whether they are competent, 
ethical, and deserving.122 The net result is that we all suffer from an 
“illusion of objectivity”123 in which we overestimate our ability to act 
ethically in the face of conflicting duties, while at the same time 
underestimating the many ways in which our desires and self-
interests can bias the decisions we reach.124
Applying this research to the types of ethical decisions that 
lawyers make, scholars have noted how easy it is to fail to make 
accurate assessments when confronting conflicts of interest.125 The 
                                                     
 121. See Ovul Sezer et al., Ethical Blind Spots: Explaining Unintentional 
Unethical Behavior, 6 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 77, 77 (2015); Bazerman & 
Gino, supra note 23, at 95; Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, Bounded Ethicality: The 
Perils of Loss Framing, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 378, 378 (2009); Dolly Chugh et al., 
Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest,
in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW,
MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 82 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter 
Bounded Ethicality].
 122. See Chugh, Bounded Ethicality, supra note 121, at 81-86; see also
Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1116. As two authors recently noted, 
“Overall, psychologists view above-average effects and comparative optimism as 
‘perhaps the two most robust and widely replicated phenomena from the literature on 
social comparative judgments.’” Ulrike Malmendier & Timothy Taylor, On the Verges 
of Overconfidence, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
 123. See Thomas Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of 
Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-
Testing Model, in 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 297, 302 
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1987). 
 124. See Chugh, Bounded Ethicality, supra note 121, at 83. For an excellent 
discussion of how the motive to view oneself in a positive light can influence 
judgments of lawyers, see Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law,
81 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (1995). 
 125. See, e.g., Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1117. This point, 
which I have discussed more fully elsewhere, see Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts,
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point is not that lawyers tend to be venal by intentionally engaging in 
behavior that is unethical, although of course that occurs on 
occasion. Rather, the research on bounded ethicality demonstrates 
that people often fail to perceive how their over-inflated self-
perception undermines their objectivity in making ethical 
decisions.126 And because this process occurs without conscious 
awareness, it happens without leaving a trace, permitting the lawyer 
to maintain a self-image as honest and ethical.127
There are many ways for students to experience the power of 
bounded ethicality. For example, early in the semester, as part of a 
blog post, I direct them to a wonderful online resource where they 
can take any number of tests that help to illuminate their ethical blind 
spots.128 Then, when we start to discuss conflicts of interest, I 
reinforce the general notion through an easy demonstration. I start by 
asking students to rate themselves regarding a set of desirable 
attributes, such how well they drive a car, how interesting they are, 
                                                                                                                
supra note 35, has also been discussed in other contexts. See, e.g., Kate Levine, Who 
Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1462 (2016); Milan 
Markovic, The Sophisticates: Conflicted Representation and the Lehman 
Bankruptcy, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 903, 915 (2012). Judicial recognition that lawyers 
are susceptible to the unconscious influences of self-interest when confronted with 
conflicts of interest has started to take hold. See, e.g., West v. People, 341 P.3d 520, 
532 (Colo. 2015) (applying the research on bounded ethicality in determining the 
meaning of an “adverse effect” when a defendant seeks a new trial claiming that a 
conflict of interest resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Ky. 
Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 154 (Ky. 2014) (citing the research on bounded 
ethicality to hold that defense lawyers cannot ethically advise a client to waive a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
 126. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1117; Chugh et al., 
Bounded Ethicality, supra note 121, at 85; Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: 
Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1090 (2011). 
 127. See Prentice, supra note 126, at 1086 (“The most discomforting thing 
about bounded ethicality is that well-intentioned people can make serious ethical 
errors without ever consciously deciding to stray from the straight and narrow.”); 
Shahar Ayal & Francesca Gino, Honest Rationales for Dishonest Behavior, in THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY 152 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 
2012) (noting that bounded ethicality causes people to “make unconscious decision 
errors that serve their self-interest but are inconsistent with their consciously 
espoused beliefs and preferences . . . [that] they would condemn upon further 
reflection or greater awareness”). 
 128. See YOURMORALS.ORG, https://www.yourmorals.org [https://perma.cc/ 
76K2-R3S8] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (free registration required). The test I encourage 
my students to take is entitled “Bias Evaluation,” which is listed under the Cognition and 
Beliefs tab on the YourMorals.org website. YOURMORALS.ORG, http://www.yourmorals. 
org/all_morality_values_quizzes.php#COGNITIONS [https://perma.cc/J9AY-RL9C] 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
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how honest they are, and finally, how modest they are.129 Then, by a 
show of hands I ask who in the class believes they are “above 
average” in each of these desirable attributes. My experience has 
been that, consistent with a large body of research on this subject,130
most students report that they are better than average on these traits. 
We then take a moment to expose the obvious problem with these 
results: By definition, no more than 50% of the population can be 
above average for any given attribute and therefore, unless the class 
is made up of students who happen to rate especially high on positive 
attributes, the fact that most of the students believe themselves to be 
above average reveals how many of them have made overconfident 
self-assessments. Once I point out this obvious fact, there tends to be 
a moment of laughter, as it sinks in that many in the class have, 
through this simple exercise, revealed the overconfidence bias. 
After the demonstration, we discuss how the research on 
bounded ethicality exposes the difficulty in making accurate self-
assessments about conflicts of interest. As a doctrinal matter, the 
rules on conflicts place the responsibility on lawyers to determine 
whether a conflict exists and, if so, whether it is consentable. These 
calculations require careful self-assessment. For example, under 
Model Rule 1.7, a lawyer must decide whether there is a significant 
risk that other duties or interests will materially limit obligations 
owed to a current client and, if so, whether despite the conflict the 
lawyer can nonetheless “provide competent and diligent 
representation.”131 To be sure, in some cases the lawyer’s self-
assessment will be subject to later review, perhaps by a disciplinary 
                                                     
 129. I borrowed these questions from an excellent TED talk on point. See Tali 
Sharot, The Optimism Bias, TED.COM, https://www.ted.com/talks/tali_sharot_the_ 
optimism_bias?language=en [https://perma.cc/E7FR-CRPE] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 130. Numerous studies demonstrate that people persistently maintain an above 
average view of themselves, for example, by believing that they possess desirable skills, 
such as driving a car, managerial prowess, productivity, and other traits. See Chugh et al., 
Bounded Ethicality, supra note 121, at 84; Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 
Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP.
109, 110-11 (1997). Similarly, people regularly overstate their contribution to a joint task, 
estimating their own contributions to be more than 50%. Id. at 111.
 131. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2), (b)(1). The rules on 
successive, or former, client conflicts also require lawyers to make risk assessments, 
for example, in determining whether there “is a substantial risk that confidential 
factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation 
would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.” Id. R. 1.9, 
cmt. 3. For a discussion of how lawyers’ conflicts of interest are essentially about 
risk analysis, see Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest 
Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823, 874 (1991-1992). 
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body, during a disqualification motion, or in a malpractice action.132
But in the vast majority of cases, there will be no after-the-fact 
review, meaning that the lawyer’s own assessment will be the only 
word on the matter. Accuracy in self-evaluation, therefore, could not 
be more important. 
In the end, my point is not to persuade my students that they 
will inevitably succumb to conflicts of interest whenever they are 
presented with an opportunity to do so. That is too strong a claim, 
one that is not supported by the research.133 Rather, as with many 
other psychological phenomena that we discuss, my goals are both to 
provide a different perspective on the rules than students might 
elsewhere receive and to start to raise their awareness of the many 
ways that, in the real world, even good people can make unethical 
choices. 
b. Incrementalism 
The metaphor of the boiling frog is well known: A frog that is 
placed in a boiling pot of water will attempt to jump out, but when 
placed in water that is slowly heated, the frog does not realize that 
the temperature is rising until it is too late.134 The point is that slow, 
incremental changes often go unnoticed. In the realm of ethics, it is 
the same. Often called the slippery slope, small transgressions that 
may seem inconsequential can multiply and become more 
pronounced, slipping into more significant ethical lapses.135 One 
psychological explanation for this phenomenon is rooted in the value 
people place on maintaining a positive self-image. When a small 
transgression occurs, there is a tendency to rationalize away the 
misbehavior so that there is no tension between one’s actions and 
one’s favorable self-image.136 The result is that, instead of having to 
                                                     
 132. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble & Scope, AM. B. ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct.html [https://perma.cc/P2US-3ESZ] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
In criminal cases, there is also the possibility of post-conviction review through a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. For a discussion of the doctrine in this area, as well as the 
psychology involved, see Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts, supra note 35, at 75. 
 133. Indeed, recent research suggests that in some cases the power of 
bounded ethicality can be diminished, at least when the incentives that produce the 
conflict are deemed “subtle.” See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Gino & Bazerman, supra note 93, at 717. 
 135. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
 136. For a recent study documenting this effect, see Welsh et al., supra note 
93. Other studies have documented the role that maintaining self-image plays in 
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confront the ethical lapse, the behavior becomes acceptable and even 
routine, making it easier to engage in increasingly unethical behavior 
without disapprobation.137 Just like the frog that does not realize the 
effects of small increases in temperature, so too small transgressions 
can pave the way for more serious misconduct without the lawyer’s 
conscious awareness.138
I find that teaching about the slippery slope is one of the most 
important lessons during the semester. For example, in the course 
book that I use there is a set of problems addressing instances in 
which lawyers lie to their own clients.139 Before I started teaching 
about behavioral legal ethics, I found that students tended to gloss 
over these indiscretions, perhaps because they believed that they 
were somewhat trivial in isolation. But once students learn about the 
psychology of the slippery slope, it becomes much easier to explore 
why seemingly small transgressions can have such a profound 
adverse result. 
My students also seem to appreciate hearing from people who 
have actually experienced the power of the slippery slope. The 
Milgram experiment, which we have already discussed in class by 
this point, is one example. As another example, in class I play a short 
video about a white-collar defendant whose road to a felony 
conviction for stealing over $500,000 from her employer started with 
one instance of failing to reimburse her company for travel 
expenses.140 The point made in the video is how the employee had 
rationalized her early and seemingly small misconduct, which led to 
                                                                                                                
mediating unethical behavior. See, e.g., Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest 
People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008); 
see also Killingsworth, supra note 120, at 5-6 (discussing maintenance of self-image 
as the motivator for rationalizing away incremental misconduct). 
 137. See Welsh et al., supra note 93; Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. 
Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior,
17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 228-29 (2004). Similarly, small incremental steps can make 
it harder to see the unethical behavior in others. See Gino & Bazerman, supra note 
93.
138. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1119-20. 
139. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 66, at 320-22 (“Problem 5-2, Lying 
to Clients”). The problem involves a number of scenarios where a lawyer misleads a 
potential or actual client—for example, by exaggerating expertise to gain a potential 
client’s trust or not telling a client that the lawyer received an extension to file a 
motion after missing the filing deadline. See id.
 140. In this video, an employee discusses her descent down the slippery 
slope that led her to steal $500,000 from her employer. See The Slippery Slope to 
Major Fraud, ASS’N CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS (Jan./Feb. 2012), http://www.
acfe.com/vid.aspx?id=4294974547 [https://perma.cc/8THZ-N2UT]. 
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more serious misbehavior and consequences.141 I also read aloud a 
few short paragraphs from an article by Judge Patrick Schiltz who 
describes vividly how slight fabrications in a lawyer’s time sheets 
can easily lead to the slippery slope of much more serious 
misbehavior.142 My hope is that through these three-dimensional 
demonstrations, students learn why it is so important for lawyers to 
act ethically, even in the smallest of matters. 
 5. The Power of Emotion 
There is a large and still growing body of literature that 
considers the broad range of ways in which emotion influences 
various aspects of law, including moral and ethical decision-
making.143 For example, many legal scholars have devoted time to 
focusing on the seminal work of psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who 
has been at the forefront in demonstrating the power of emotion and 
intuition in moral decision-making.144 His social-intuitionist model 
makes the central point that moral reasoning does not produce most 
moral judgments; rather, as a large body of experimental data 
demonstrates, they are the product of the emotional and intuitive 
responses that precede conscious awareness.145 Placing this idea into 
a larger social fabric, he argues that people are poorly equipped 
individually to change their opinions about deeply held beliefs, but 
                                                     
 141. For more details, see Confessions of a Con Artist, CNN MONEY (Nov. 
30, 2011, 1:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/30/smallbusiness/con_artist
[https://perma.cc/5FEK-GAYJ]. 
 142. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an 
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 916-18 (1999). 
 143. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 799, 800-01 (2015); ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 
45-66; Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161 (2012). 
 144. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational 
Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 954-63 (2007); Paul H. Robinson et al., The 
Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1685 (2007). For my 
earlier description of Professor Haidt’s work, see Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts,
supra note 35, at 69-70. 
 145. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) 
[hereinafter The Emotional Dog]. For other descriptions of the social-intuitionist 
model, including responses to critics, see Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Gets 
Mistaken for a Possum, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 283, 283 (2004); Jonathan Haidt & 
Craig Joseph, Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate 
Culturally Variable Virtues, 133 DAEDALUS 55, 56 (2004). 
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instead are much more likely to be influenced by the dominant social 
group to which they belong.146
In teaching these concepts, simulation exercises that invoke 
emotional reactions tend to work best. Fortunately, the course book 
for my class provides a number of excellent opportunities to employ 
this approach. For example, early in the semester when we are 
discussing client confidentiality, we engage in a role-play involving 
a grieving father who, during a meeting with two defense lawyers, 
presses for information about the whereabouts of the father’s missing 
(and presumably dead) child.147 I play the role of the father, while 
students take the role of the lawyers. In pushing the students to 
reveal the whereabouts of the missing child during the simulation, I 
try to elevate the desperate nature of the father’s plight, imploring 
the students to disregard their confidentiality duties to help locate the 
missing child. It becomes an emotionally charged conversation, to 
say the least. And while none of the students have yet violated their 
duty of client confidentiality during this simulation, I find that in the 
debrief afterward many students seem attentive to the possibility that 
ethical deliberation can be influenced and altered by emotionally 
                                                     
 146. See Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 145, at 819; HAIDT, supra
note 101, at 46-48. The metaphor he has developed in recent writing makes this 
point poignantly: Human rationality is akin to a Rider who is atop of an Elephant, 
which represents our emotions. See HAIDT, supra note 101, at 52-71; HAIDT, supra
note 53. The Rider may want to change the course or direction of the Elephant, but 
inevitably will fail when all six tons of the Elephant want to go elsewhere. As a 
result, the best approach to changing one’s reasoning process is not by forcing 
oneself through sheer will to alter one’s views on an emotionally charged issue, but 
rather to attempt to alter the path of the Elephant in the first place. Id. As one 
example, Professor Haidt describes a project he co-directs that is dedicated to 
political civility, www.CivilPolitics.org. Jonathan Haidt, Reasons Matter (When 
Intuitions Don’t Object), N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://opinionator. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/reasons-matter-when-intuitions-dont-object/ [https://perma. 
cc/F85Y-SVXH]. In explaining the goals of the project, he notes:  
We believe this ability [civility] is best fostered by indirect methods 
(changing contexts, payoffs and institutions) rather than by direct methods 
(such as pleading with people to be more civil, or asking people to sign 
civility pledges). In other words, we hope to open up space for civil 
disagreement by creating contexts in which elephants (automatic 
processes and intuitions) are calmer, rather than by asking riders
(controlled processes, including reasoning) to try harder.  
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
 147. This role-play is based on the famous “dead bodies case,” which is 
addressed extensively in the course book for my course. See Mark Hansen, The 
Toughest Call, 93 A.B.A. J. 28, 28-29 (2007); LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 66, at 
173-85.
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charged events. During the discussion, I also take a few minutes to 
highlight Professor Haidt’s research on the role of emotion in 
decision-making, asking the students to consider the possibility that 
they are in less control of their decision-making processes than they 
might realize. Later in the semester, I reinforce this point in a blog 
entry about moral psychology, which contains an extended video of 
Professor Haidt’s work.148
 6. The Role of Narrative 
The value of teaching legal ethics through narrative and case 
studies is well known.149 Stories have the power, for example, to help 
students develop empathy,150 connect more broadly and directly to 
the emotional life of those accused of wrongdoing,151 and deepen 
their appreciation of the rich context in which a lawyer’s ethical 
decisions are made.152 Stories are also deeply engaging, making the 
material more accessible and enjoyable to learn.153
There is another aspect of storytelling that matters in the 
context of behavioral legal ethics. A significant strand of 
psychological research focuses on the need of people to make sense 
of the world.154 The central idea here is that when confronted with 
multiple and confusing stimuli, we use a variety of techniques to 
filter and organize and make sense of our experiences.155 One 
                                                     
 148. A number of excellent videos are available, including the one I use. See,
e.g., Hear the Reasons, Jonathan Haidt – The Rationalist Delusion in Moral 
Psychology, YOUTUBE (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
kI1wQswRVaU [https://perma.cc/A4UF-AUNQ].  
 149. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using 
Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000); 
Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics with Stories About Clients, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 421 (1998); Stephen Gillers, Getting Personal, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61 (1995). 
 150. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 149, at 791. 
 151. See id. at 792. 
 152. See id. at 793-95. 
 153. See Nancy Levit, Legal Storytelling: The Theory and the Practice—
Reflective Writing Across the Curriculum, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 259, 263 (2009). 
 154. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 50, at 219-20. As one author has 
noted, “We all are confronted with multiple stimuli in our environment, and we must 
impose some structure upon it for it to ‘make sense.’ We use various cues, patterns, 
routines, and scripts, typically created jointly with others, to help us accomplish this 
task.” Regan, supra note 144, at 951; see generally KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING 
IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995). 
 155. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 50-58 (discussing automatic 
associative coherence). 
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significant aspect of sense-making, which some argue is 
foundational, is the stories we tell to ourselves and others.156 As 
Donald Langevoort has noted, “[S]tories have a greater capacity to 
influence than more rational forms of discourse.”157 I agree, having 
found that one of the most effective ways to help students appreciate 
the subtle and unconscious aspects of decision-making is by sharing 
stories about how lawyers actually behave.158
There is no shortage of such tales to be told from a behavioral 
perspective.159 One that I find quite useful, and which I raise during 
discussion of Model Rule 1.13,160 is the Tyco debacle of more than a 
decade ago. During our class discussions of the “reporting up” and 
“reporting out” requirements of the rule,161 I play a short video about 
                                                     
 156. Langevoort, supra note 65, at 1594. One of the pioneers of cognitive 
psychology, Jerome Bruner, believes that construction of narrative is the central 
aspect of experience. See generally Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of 
Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 1-21 (1991). For his excellent discussion with his 
co-author of the role of narrative in legal discourse, see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 120-21 (2000). 
 157. See Langevoort, supra note 65, at 1594. 
 158. Others have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Joseph W. Rand, 
Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching 
Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 731, 749 (2003). 
 159. For example, more than one author has explored the behavioral aspects of 
the story of John Gallene, the disgraced bankruptcy partner at the Wall Street law firm 
of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 
1114-16; Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law Firm That Did Nothing 
in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98, 98–114 (2007) (reviewing Milton Regan’s 
EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004)). Many other 
notable stories of misconduct are told from a behavioral perspective, including the 
collapse of Enron, see Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1373 (2003); Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy,
40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417 (2003); the demise of the major Wall Street Law firm, Dewey & 
LeBoeuf, see Nancy B. Rapoport, “Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using Default 
Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 42, 46 n.11, 59-61 (2014); a major scandal in Australia 
involving the Australian Wheat Board also involved behavioral perspectives, see Kath 
Hall & Vivien Holmes, The Power of Rationalization to Influence Lawyers’ Decisions 
to Act Unethically, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 137 (2009); and the case of a lawyer at the U.S. 
Department of Justice who claims that she lost her job after providing her client advice 
it did not favor. See McGowan, Office Politics, supra note 13. Indeed, even works of 
fiction have given rise to a behavioral analysis. See Painter, supra note 12 (discussing 
the psychological lessons that emerge from Arthur Solmssen’s novel, THE COMFORT 
LETTER (1975)). 
 160. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 161. Model Rule 1.13(b) places responsibility on a lawyer for an 
organization to report possible wrongdoing to a higher authority within the 
organization under certain circumstances (the “reporting up” rule), whereas Model 
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the various misdeeds of Dennis Kozlowski, the former CEO of Tyco 
who was convicted of extensive fraud and larceny from the 
company,162 which opens up a good discussion about the obligations 
that the company’s in-house lawyer might have had regarding 
Kozlowski’s criminal behavior.163 Most students recognize that a 
lawyer for the company who had contemporaneous knowledge of 
Kozlowski’s misconduct would have owed obligations under the 
rule.164 At the same time, they seem to appreciate—at a cursory 
level—some of the behavioral reasons why it might have been 
difficult for anyone inside the company to report Kozlowski’s 
profligate spending and other misbehavior. 
After this short discussion, we continue this theme on the class 
blog, where I post a summary of a wonderful article by Sung Hui 
Kim, who has meticulously described the story of Mark Belnick, 
Tyco’s former General Counsel.165 Belnick, who was charged but 
eventually acquitted of criminal activity in the case, received a 
remarkable compensation package at Tyco, which included, in 
addition to his salary, a $17 million bonus for helping Tyco 
successfully handle an SEC inquiry, and $14 million in interest-free 
loans to renovate a $2.8 million Manhattan apartment and purchase a 
$10 million home in Park City, Utah.166 The Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office, which brought the criminal charges against 
                                                                                                                
Rule 1.13(c) permits, but does not require, a lawyer to disclose otherwise 
confidential information about wrongdoing to those outside the organization under 
certain circumstances (the “reporting out” rule). See id. R. 1.13(b)-(c). 
 162. The video segment is a profile of Dennis Kozlowski conducted by 60
Minutes. See gzfraud, Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski CBS 60 Minutes Prison 
Interview, YOUTUBE (Sept. 5, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
MymLaVYsyHw [https://perma.cc/DD7F-FGP6]. 
 163. For more on Kozlowski and the Tyco scandal, see David Kaplan, 
Tyco’s ‘Piggy,’ Out of Prison and Living Small, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/business/dealbook/dennis-kozlowskis-path-
from-infamy-to-obscurity.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A2SR-CAUX]; Mark 
Maremont & Laurie P. Cohen, Tyco Spent Millions for Benefit of Kozlowski, Its 
Former CEO, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2002, 9:52 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB1028674808717845320 [https://perma.cc/F3Z2-VQFF]. 
 164. It should be noted that the “reporting out” provision of Model Rule 
1.13(c) did not exist at time of the Tyco scandal and, indeed, was enacted in 
response to corporate fiascos such as Tyco, Enron, and WorldCom. See Ronald D. 
Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S
GUIDE, § 1.13-2(d), 615-18 (West 2012-2013). As a result, for the purposes of our 
class discussion, I ask the students to assume that Model Rule 1.13(c) had been in 
force at the time of Dennis Kozlowski’s misconduct. 
 165. See Kim, supra note 43. 
 166. See id. at 1005-06. 
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Belnick, claimed that this financial compensation package was 
essentially “hush money” paid when Belnick was hired to ensure that 
he would not disclose Kozlowski’s rampant financial misdeeds.167
As part of this blog post, I discuss the various psychological 
factors Professor Kim has identified that help to explain Belnick’s 
failure to uncover and report Kozlowski’s wrongdoing. These 
include many of the factors we have already discussed in class, such 
as the power of obedience as demonstrated by the Milgram 
experiments;168 the power of self-interest that, because of self-serving 
biases and motivated reasoning, can cause people to interpret 
information in a self-serving manner;169 and the power of conformity 
pressure.170 Then I ask the students whether, from their perspective, 
Belnick should be seen as a villain in this tale, as someone who 
should have known better but who fell prey to many of the 
psychological pressures to which we are all susceptible, or as an 
innocent victim with no blame at all.171 I end the discussion by 
wondering in how many other cases lawyers for organizations (even 
without the lavish compensation package received by Belnick) might 
be tempted to succumb to the psychological pressures described by 
Professor Kim and how these pressures might influence decisions 
regarding the obligations to report up and out under MR 1.13. 
From my perspective, using a narrative approach such as the 
Tyco story, rich as it is in detail and intrigue, contextualizes the 
behavioral concepts discussed during the semester and helps to make 
behavioral legal ethics come alive in a way that deepens an 
understanding of the material. 
 7. Prevention
One confounding aspect of the lessons from behavioral science 
is that because the factors that influence judgment and behavior 
largely occur outside of conscious awareness, they are difficult to 
                                                     
 167. See id. at 989. 
 168. See id. at 992-96, 1001-04. 
 169. See id. at 1005-08, 1029-34. 
 170. See id. at 1019-24. Other psychological factors are also at play, 
Professor Kim argues, including the pressures to align one’s views with those of the 
client and the influence of role ideology. See id. at 1008-11, 1012-18. 
 171. Belnick continues to proclaim his own innocence, stating in 2006, 
“[T]here is nothing I would have done differently, absolutely nothing. I was never 
asked to do anything wrong.” Mark Belnick Tells His Story, INSIDE COUNS. (May 30, 
2006), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2006/05/30/mark-belnick-tells-his-story?page=1& 
slreturn=1448899387 [https://perma.cc/55UA-DXEM]. 
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counteract.172 That said, there are a number of interventions that have 
been identified as helpful in reducing the biases produced by 
unconscious influences. Throughout the semester, I explore these 
interventions, and the science behind them, in a variety of ways. 
To begin with, merely becoming aware of the power of subtle 
situational and cognitive forces, while no panacea, can help lawyers 
develop appropriate strategies to counteract biased decision-
making.173 For example, knowing about the power of the slippery 
slope can attune lawyers to the importance of being vigilant in 
respecting all of their ethical duties, even those that might seem 
trivial in some matters.174 I try to impart this lesson many times, 
discussing why it is so important to always respect the ethical 
boundaries of the rules. When discussing whether it is ever 
permissible to lie to clients, for instance, I explain that some lawyers 
may feel comfortable instructing an assistant to fend off 
communications by an overly intrusive client by fibbing about 
whether the lawyer is in the office. This type of “white lie,” on its 
own, may produce little harm. But when viewed through the science 
of the slippery slope, the danger of such small transgressions 
becomes more apparent. My goal is to encourage students to realize 
that persistent ethical conduct is not only right, but also is a buffer 
against the dangers of incrementalism. In a broader sense, my hope is 
that by discussing the various components of behavioral legal ethics, 
the students will develop creative ways to combat the pull towards 
unethical behavior. 
There are, in addition, specific strategies that can be employed 
to help reduce the power of unconscious influences. For example, 
one way to increase the possibility of ethical behavior is for lawyers 
to make salient the ethical dimensions of decisions at the time they 
are made.175 We discuss this strategy both in class and on the blog, 
                                                     
 172. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing 
Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 26, at 185, 189-92. 
 173. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1157-58. As Professor 
Rhode has noted: 
[Legal ethics education] can also make individuals aware of how 
economic incentives, peer influence, and diffused responsibility can skew 
judgment, and how to design appropriate responses. Although the 
classroom experience cannot fully simulate the pressures of practice, it can 
provide a setting to explore their causes and correctives before individuals 
have a stake in coming out one way rather than another. 
Rhode, supra note 1, at 49. 
 174. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1157. 
 175. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1158-61. 
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noting that ethical fading occurs when people fail to perceive the 
ethical aspects of their decisions.176 To reinforce this point, at the end 
of the semester I provide each student with a picture that includes a 
quote by Martin Luther King, Jr. that I believe captures the 
importance of persistent ethics: “The time is always right to do [what 
is] right.”177 My hope, which I express when the students receive 
these pictures, is that they will place this quote in their workspace. 
Perhaps, as the research suggests, such a reminder front and center 
will make ethics salient at the time that these future lawyers are 
called upon to make decisions with ethical consequences. 
Another strategy that has also been documented to help loosen 
the binds of unconscious influences is known as “perspective 
taking.”178 The basic notion is that biases can be lessened if the 
decision-maker consciously seeks to engage in thinking that is 
inconsistent with the positions that are likely to produce biased 
reasoning. So, for example, one might seek to better understand the 
viewpoint that is opposite of one’s preferred position.179
Gaining an outsider’s perspective, by trying to consider how a 
disinterested person would view the situation, or by obtaining 
counsel from someone who can view the situation more objectively, 
can also help.180 These are ideas that can be explored in various ways. 
Early in the semester, for instance, we discuss a case, Kelly v. 
                                                     
 176. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. For the seminal work on 
ethical fading, see Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 137, at 228. 
 177. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Southern Methodist University 
(Mar. 17, 1966). Others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g., Robbennolt & 
Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1159 (“A paperweight, wall hanging, or other memento 
can be a visual reminder of the standards one wants to uphold.”). 
 178. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 25-26. 
 179. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1159. Considering 
counterarguments that can weaken one’s position, for example, has been 
demonstrated to reduce self-serving biases. See Linda Babcock et al., Creating
Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 916 (1997) 
(discussing research results). However, there is also evidence that encouraging 
lawyers to consider viewpoints opposite of their own is not an effective debiasing 
technique. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ 
Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010) 
(finding that considering the opposite did not reduce overconfidence of lawyers in 
predicting case outcomes). 
180. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1160. Instructors must be 
careful, however, in teaching about perspective taking, as in some instances it has been 
found that attempting to take a perspective of another can amplify, rather than reduce, 
biased decision-making. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 29, at 25.  
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Hunton & Williams,181 which involved the courageous decision by a 
group of young associates at a prestigious law firm to report the 
overbilling practices of one of the firm’s rainmakers. In rendering its 
decision, the court noted that the associates raised the rainmaker’s 
misdeeds with management of the firm after receiving counsel from 
a trusted outside advisor, a federal judge for whom one of the 
associates had clerked.182 When discussing this case, I make note of 
this aspect of the decision, highlighting how obtaining advice of an 
outsider can make it easier to overcome the barriers to ethical 
behavior. 
I also raise another important point during the discussion of the 
Kelly case, which I reinforce over the semester: The decision to 
report the billing abuse was not the result of one courageous lawyer 
acting alone; rather, a group of three associates worked together to 
gather evidence of the overbilling and report it to the firm’s 
managers.183 This is an example of another approach to reducing the 
power of unconscious bias. Recall that Solomon Asch’s experiments 
revealed that it is easier to resist the power to conform when others 
do so as well.184 This is an important lesson from the Kelly case: The 
three associates acting together were able to do what one of them 
alone may not have—overcome the pressure to stay silent in the face 
of obvious misbehavior by a senior member of the firm. 
There are many other techniques that that can be employed to 
help reduce unethical behavior and that might be useful to emphasize 
for anyone who plans to teach this material. An instructor, for 
example, might focus on approaches offered by experts on how to 
plan responses to future ethical problems before they occur.185 There 
are also many institutional responses that are available to enhance 
the ethical culture of workplaces, which can make it less likely that 
individuals will be subject to the incentives and pressures that can 
produce unethical behavior.186 While I have not yet focused on these 
approaches in any detail, I hope do so in developing and expanding 
my approach in future years. 
                                                     
 181. Kelly v. Hunton & Williams, No. 97-CV-5631 (JG), 1999 WL 408416 
(E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1999). 
182. See id. at *3. 
 183. Id.
184. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
185. See, e.g., infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text. 
186. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1169-81 (discussing 
ways organizations can improve ethical culture to mitigate the unconscious aspects 
of unethical decision-making). 
802 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
 8. Summary 
The subjects and techniques described so far provide a flavor of 
the many ways in which I have integrated behavioral legal ethics into 
the pedagogy of my professional responsibility class. While I have 
attempted to make these and other behavioral concepts a core feature 
of the course, there is also a large body of empirical research that I 
have not yet attempted to address. In this respect, teaching 
behavioral ethics is both exciting and challenging, as there is such a 
wide amount of material from which to draw when planning the 
curriculum. My approach is a work-in-progress. And while it is 
premature to draw any final conclusions about the endeavor, 
teaching behavioral science to law students has already produced an 
opportunity to make some observations about the experience. 
III. REFLECTIONS
Reflecting on teaching behavioral legal ethics over the last two 
years, three observations stand out. The first concerns the overall 
effectiveness of this approach. On this score, my preliminary 
assessment is that teaching behavioral science as part of a survey 
course in professional responsibility can enhance the core ethics 
curriculum, although additional forms of assessment will be useful in 
deciding how to improve this approach as it continues. Second, 
anyone who plans to teach behavioral legal ethics should seek to stay 
abreast of current developments in the subject, both to incorporate 
new findings into the curriculum and also to be able to address any 
methodological questions that arise about the science that undergirds 
the field. Third, because the approach described in Part II is but one 
way that behavioral legal ethics can be integrated into the 
professional responsibility curriculum, some other possible 
approaches, as well as future directions in this area, are explored. 
A. Assessing the Experience 
One measure of this endeavor is how students have responded 
to learning about behavioral legal ethics. If the first two years using 
this approach are a valid indication, the majority of my students have 
reported that they find that it has been beneficial. In the most recent 
class (spring 2015), for example, the students completed a short, 
anonymous survey, which asked on a scale of 1 to 5 how they rated 
learning about the psychological dimensions of ethical decision-
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making.187 The 39 students who took the survey rated the experience 
positively, with the class average of 4.5 out of 5.188
The student comments flush out these reactions. For example, 
one student said, “[K]nowing the rules will only be helpful if you are 
aware of how you will act when faced with ethical 
dilemmas.”189Another made a similar point: “I found the psychology 
of legal ethics extremely helpful. It really allowed me to focus in on 
the issues I know I will be challenged with when I enter the legal 
profession.”190 Other comments were similar.191
My sense is that there are at least three reasons why students 
have been receptive to this approach. The first concerns the role of 
context. Students seem to appreciate the human agency involved in 
ethical decision-making, recognizing that there is no way to fully 
appreciate how, as future lawyers, they will respond to ethically 
fraught situations until they are placed in real world contexts, with 
all of the associated pressures. This is one reason that, as others have 
noted, teaching ethics contextually provides a more complete and 
developed sense of the types of experiences that students will face in 
practice.192 Teaching behavioral science in the ethics curriculum 
                                                     
 187. I administered the survey on the last class of the semester (April 22, 
2015), with 39 of the 42 registered students in attendance. The methodology was as 
follows: toward the end of the class, I handed the students index cards and asked 
them anonymously to “Rate 1 to 5 (5 being the highest)” their answers to this 
question: “To what extent did you find it useful to learn about the psychology of 
legal ethics?” I also asked the students to “[a]dd any comments you think 
appropriate.” All 39 students in attendance provided comments, although one 
student did not provide a rating. I do not profess that this survey meets the rigor of 
scientific validity, although it is one measure of the student reaction to the 
experience of learning behavioral legal ethics.  
  In addition, I administered a survey in the first year of teaching 
behavioral ethics in the course (spring 2014), using an online survey instrument that 
asked students to rate the class blog based on whether it was “educational” and 
“enjoyable to read.” While this online survey also produced favorable ratings, it is 
less reliable than the in-class survey administered in spring 2015 due to the response 
rate: only 21 of the 39 class completed the spring 2014 online survey, producing a 
response bias. 
 188. Of the 38 students who provided ratings, 24 students rated the 
experience at 5.0; 2 rated it at 4.5; 10 rated it at 4.0; 1 rated it at 3.5; 1 rated it at 3.0; 
and 1 rated it at 2.0 (on file with author). 
 189. Student comment to anonymous survey, April 22, 2015 (on file with author). 
 190. Id.
 191. For example, one student added, “I think a conversation about ethics 
that doesn’t include a psychological component is not a full or helpful discussion,” 
while another stated that it is “kind of hard to imagine studying ethics without any 
mention of the psychological issues at this point.” Id.
 192. See supra notes 3, 8 and accompanying text. 
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amplifies this theme, by helping students understand the subtle ways 
that various situations can influence ethical behavior. And while no 
course can fully replicate the real world situations awaiting future 
lawyers, by experiencing and then discussing many of the influences 
and pressures that may await them, students seem to gain a better 
appreciation for why context matters. 
Again, the student comments reflect this conclusion. For 
example, one student said that learning about psychology “helps give 
a glimpse into the real world” factors that “influence our decisions 
on ethical standards.”193 Another student made a similar point: “I 
found it helpful to learn about psychology and very interesting as 
well. It gives you a view of how these rules act in the real world and 
how it’s not that easy all the time to follow these rules exactly.”194
Such comments suggest that the students recognize that learning the 
foundations of behavioral science can help them to understand the 
dynamics of how ethical decisions occur, including the many subtle 
psychological factors that can influence their future conduct in the 
practice of law. 
A second explanation for the positive reception concerns the 
level of student engagement. Anyone who teaches legal ethics knows 
that, unfortunately, sustaining student attention and active 
engagement often can be difficult.195 One reason may be that students 
often feel that learning the rules of professional responsibility, 
without more, is not sufficiently stimulating to pique and sustain 
their interest.196 While there are many ways to improve 
engagement,197 I have found that using the techniques described in 
                                                     
 193. See Student Comment to Anonymous Survey, April 22, 2015 (on file 
with author). 
 194. See id.
 195. See Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics, supra note 12, at 1048 (explaining 
many reasons students are disinclined to relish courses in legal ethics); Green, supra
note 4, at 358-59 (discussing student dissatisfaction with the legal ethics 
curriculum). Alas, this observation is nothing new. See Steven Lubet, I Teach Legal 
Ethics, 13 J. LEGAL PROF. 133, 133 (1988) (describing “widespread student apathy 
and dissatisfaction” with a required class in professional ethics). 
 196. The many challenges of teaching a standard survey course in legal 
ethics are well known, including the general apathy for the course inside of law 
school, the unease many students (and faculty) feel at discussing morally ambiguous 
situations, and the lack of experience by most students with the types of situations 
that provide context for rich discussions of ethical behavior. See Rhode, Teaching 
Legal Ethics, supra note 12, at 1048. 
 197. For example, one way is by teaching legal ethics in conjunction with 
actual practice settings, such as placements and externships. See David Luban & 
Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J.
 Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics 805 
Part II—especially teaching through simulations,198 extensive use of 
multimedia,199 and the use of interactive technology, such as the extra 
credit blog200—has helped students stay engaged and interested 
throughout the semester.201 Such techniques can be particularly 
useful in teaching the “millennial generation” who seem to desire 
these and other similar forms of pedagogy.202
A final aspect, related to student engagement, concerns the 
quality of the discussion in the classroom, especially about morally 
                                                                                                                
LEGAL ETHICS 31, 64-65 (1995); Rhode, supra note 1, at 52-53. Many of the ideas 
presented in this Article could be used in combination with such an approach. 
 198. Others have extolled the benefits of using simulations and other forms 
of experiential learning to teach legal ethics. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching 
Ethics in and Outside of Law Schools: What Works and What Doesn’t, PROF. LAW.
SYMP. 57, 59-60 (2006); James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential 
Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 75 (1996); 
Gillers, supra note 149, at 62-63.
 199. The value of using film, video, and other forms of multimedia to teach
legal ethics has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics, supra
note 12, at 1053; John Batt, Law, Science, and Narrative: Reflections on Brain 
Science, Electronic Media, Story, and Law Learning, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19 (1990). 
 200. For a description of the trend toward increased use of interactive 
technology as an important component of legal education, see Michele Pistone, Law
Schools and Technology: Where We Are and Where We Are Heading, 64 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 586 (2014); DAVID I. C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR 
A DIGITAL AGE 5-8 (2009). For other examples of how blogs have been integrated 
successfully into the law school curriculum, see Patrick E. Longan, Teaching
Professionalism, 60 MERCER L. REV. 659, 693 (2008). See also Stephen M. Johnson, 
Teaching for Tomorrow: Utilizing Technology to Implement the Reforms of 
MacCrate, Carnegie, and Best Practices, 92 NEB. L. REV. 46, 66 (2013). One 
fascinating example is Lewis & Clark Law School’s Transformative Immigration 
Law Seminar. As part of the course, students research and create blog posts utilizing 
social science research as an advocacy tool, creating authority (the blog posts 
themselves) to be used by advocates in the field of immigration law. See Juliet 
Stumpf, At the Border of the Classroom, U. OXFORD (Sept. 21, 2015), 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2015/09/border-classroom [https://perma.cc/9LFR-U8LH].  
 201. A number of student comments in the course noted that integration of 
the psychological aspects of ethical decision-making made the course “interesting,” 
“helpful,” “enjoyable,” “refreshing,” and “fun.” Student Comments to Anonymous 
Survey, April 22, 2015 (on file with author). 
 202. See Elizabeth M. Bloom, A Law School Game Changer: (Trans)formative 
Feedback, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (2015) (“Millennial students ask for 
‘self-directed learning, interactive environments, multiple forms of feedback, and 
assignment choices that use different resources to create personally meaningful 
learning experiences.’” (quoting Emily A. Benfer & Colleen D. Shanahan, Educating 
the Invincibles: Strategies for Teaching the Millennial Generation in Law School,
20 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 10 (2013))); THOMSON, supra note 200 (discussing 
technological competencies and expectations of the Millennial generation). 
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ambiguous and difficult situations. Before I started to integrate a 
behavioral component into my class, I noticed that students often 
seemed reticent to declare publically their views about difficult 
ethical dilemmas. Indeed, more than once I recall when, in response 
to questions, students were unwilling to disclose their own feelings, 
perhaps because of a fear that their responses would be judged either 
by their classmates or by me.203 Teaching behavioral ethics has 
altered this dynamic to some extent; that is, after we discuss the 
psychological dimensions of ethical behavior, especially the reasons 
why even good people can engage in misconduct, I have found that 
many students seem freer to express their own private views about 
difficult ethical decisions. While I do not know whether there is any 
causal connection for this greater openness and willingness to 
engage, my suspicion is that the students feel more at ease discussing 
their own views, knowing that their responses will not be considered 
an automatic reflection of their own moral character. 
As these student responses suggest, teaching behavioral legal 
ethics as part of the ethics curriculum has, to date, been a positive 
experience. But it is important not to overemphasize the students’ 
comments, which alone do not determine the extent to which they 
have actually learned and internalized the behavioral concepts they 
were taught. To answer this harder question, an additional level of 
assessment is needed. One option would be to add a component of 
summative assessment at the end of the semester, such as a final 
exam that includes questions that focus on the behavioral science 
taught in the course.204 I have resisted assessing in this manner for 
three reasons. First, much of the material is taught for extra credit 
and the students that avail themselves of that option do so with an 
expectation that their performance will not otherwise be graded. 
Second, while there is certainly value in summative assessment tools 
such as a final exam, there are also dangers—for example, turning 
the experience of learning into a competitive enterprise in which the 
students study the material primarily for an end-of-semester grade 
rather than for the intrinsic value of learning the material itself.205
Third, given that much of what the students learn occurs 
experientially, I have doubts that testing the students through a final 
                                                     
 203. Others have noted similar reticence by students. See Rhode, Teaching 
Legal Ethics, supra note 12, at 1048-49. 
 204. For a description of summative assessment and its comparison to 
formative assessment, see Bloom, supra note 202, at 232-35. 
 205. For a discussion of some of these dangers in the context of teaching 
professional responsibility, see SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 149-50.  
 Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics 807 
exam about their knowledge of the material is the proper assessment 
technique for my course. 
Fortunately, there are other ways to assess student learning. To 
begin with, the science on assessment, which has become an 
important topic surrounding the entire law school curriculum,206
indicates that formative assessment, where students are provided 
ongoing feedback, can be an effective measure. To some extent, this 
form of assessment is built into the methods I have employed. For 
example, I provide written feedback to the students who comment on 
the extra credit blog.207 In this way, I am able both to evaluate the 
quality of the comments made by the students and provide feedback 
almost immediately. Additional opportunities for formative 
assessment and feedback occur for those students who decide to 
write their own blog entries on a particular aspect of behavioral legal 
ethics.
Another form of assessment, which I have not yet employed 
but plan to use in the future, involves student self-evaluations in 
which students assess their own learning of the subject matter. By 
using appropriate benchmarks, these comparisons provide an 
opportunity to gauge the degree of learning that takes place during 
the semester.208
                                                     
 206. The American Bar Association recently adopted new accreditation 
standards relating to obligations of member law schools to develop and implement 
proper outcome measures. See David Thomson, When the ABA Comes Calling, Let’s 
Speak the Same Language of Assessment, 23 PERSPECTIVES 68 (2014). These 
developments have transpired against the backdrop of a number of influential 
reports calling for better assessment of the law school curriculum. See, e.g., ROY 
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 108-09 (Clinical Legal 
Educ. Ass’n ed., 2007); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 7-9. 
 207. For example, during the spring 2015 semester, I provided written 
comments to twenty-six of the forty-one student comments to the blog.  
 208. In one format, this approach can assess student understanding of the 
subject at the beginning of the course (the “pre” measure) and then again at the end 
of the course (the “post” measure). By comparing the two sets of responses, an 
evaluation can be made of the degree of learning that apparently occurs. See
Drumwright et al., supra note 12, at 450. The challenge of this approach, as others 
have noted, is that the student perceptions of what is being studied can change 
during the semester, invalidating the comparison of the responses. See id.; Tony 
Lam & Priscilla Bengo, A Comparison of Three Retrospective Self-Reporting 
Methods of Measuring Change in Instructional Practice, 24 AM. J. EVALUATION 65, 
67-68 (2003). One way to address this confounding element, known as “response 
shift,” is to use a “pre-then-post” approach, in which the students at the beginning of 
the semester assess their knowledge of the subject matter, then at the end of the 
semester answer two sets of questions: the first asks them to evaluate retrospectively 
their knowledge of the subject at the beginning of the semester (the “then” measure); 
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Finally, there is a need to determine whether teaching law 
students about the psychology of decision-making improves their 
ethical behavioral after entering practice. Having taught from a 
behavioral perspective for only two years, it would be premature to 
attempt any such assessment based on my experience so far. But as 
the field of behavioral legal ethics matures, and more students are 
exposed to the lessons behavioral science has to offer, it will be 
important to seek proper measures. And while developing techniques 
to assess the effectiveness of this (or any) form of ethics instruction 
will be a challenge,209 it is a project well worth pursuing. 
Overall, the initial feedback from my students indicates that 
teaching behavioral legal ethics enhances the legal ethics curriculum. 
Recognizing that my approach is a work in progress, my goal is to 
continue to find ways to enhance and measure student understanding, 
appreciation, and, ultimately, real world application of this important 
material. 
B. Developments in Behavioral Science 
As an empirical discipline, behavioral legal ethics is only as 
viable as the science upon which it rests. As a result, any instructor 
who plans to incorporate behavioral insights into the ethics 
curriculum will need to maintain familiarity with methodological 
questions that have been raised and the applicable science in the area. 
Initially, anyone teaching this material should be aware of the 
general skepticism that some have posed as to whether the core 
findings of behavioral science have relevance to law in general. 
These doubts emerged shortly after the inception of interdisciplinary 
work into behavioral law and economics more than a decade ago.210
Since then, proponents of a behavioral approach have responded 
                                                                                                                
and the second asks them to assess their degree of knowledge at the end of the 
semester (the “post” measure). See Drumwright et al., supra note 12, at 450. 
Comparing the differences between the “then” and “post” responses has been 
demonstrated to provide a more accurate assessment than the traditional “pre” and 
“post” method. Id.
 209. See, e.g., Drumwright et al., supra note 12, at 447. 
 210. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality 
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 
GEO. L.J. 67, 72-73 (2002) (arguing against a behavioral approach to law); Richard A. 
Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 
(1998) (questioning the role of behavioral law and economics). 
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forcefully and largely successfully.211 One leading authority has even 
declared “victory” in this debate, noting the overwhelming 
acceptance among legal scholars of the role that behavioral science 
should play in assessing law’s prescriptions.212 Nor is this acceptance 
in the legal realm unique; rather, the last number of years has seen 
expanding use of behavioral science to address a wide array of public 
policy issues213—further evidence of the ascendency of the field. 
Anyone who plans to teach behavioral science would be well served 
to stay abreast of these and related discussions,214 both to respond to 
                                                     
 211. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of 
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (2003); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 743 (2000). 
 212. See Korobkin, supra note 26, at 1653-55 (noting that two prominent law 
review articles favoring the incorporation of a behavioral approach to law and economics 
have been the most cited law works of scholarship from 1995 through 2011). 
 213. For example, in 2010 the British government created the Behavioural 
Insights Team that has found various ways to incorporate behavioral science into a 
wide array of policy prescriptions. See BEHAV. INSIGHTS TEAM, http://www. 
behaviouralinsights.co.uk [https://perma.cc/L5NW-YTY4] (last visited Sept. 23, 
2016); see also Evan Nesterak, Behavioral Insights Team 5 Years On: A 
Conversation with Owain Service, PSYCH REP. (Nov. 3, 2015), http:// thepsychreport. 
com/politics/the-behavioral-insights-team-5-years-on-a-conversation-with-owain-service 
[https://perma.cc/NQU9-7RPN] (describing various ways that behavioral science is 
improving public policy, such as increasing participation rates in job training and 
placement programs, enhancing small business participation in programs designed to 
reduce costs, encouraging the use of alternatives to cigarettes to reduce the harms 
caused by tobacco consumption, and increasing organ donations). In the United 
States, a recently announced executive order instructs all federal agencies to find 
ways to apply the lessons of behavioral science in fulfilling their objectives. See
Exec. Order No. 13707, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 15, 2015). This step has been 
lauded as a major achievement for a behavioral approach to public policy, revealing 
the value of behavioral science in addressing important matters of social concern. 
See Francesca Gino, Why the U.S. Government Is Embracing Behavioral Science,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 18, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/09/why-the-u-s-government-
is-embracing-behavioral-science [https://perma.cc/6FSM-27ZH] (last visited Sept. 23, 
2016). 
 214. More recently, there has been a robust debate within the field of 
psychology more generally about whether the results of many studies are as valid as 
claimed. Much of this concern centers around what some are calling a “replicability 
crisis” in which a number of well-known studies have failed to replicate in 
subsequent experiments, leading some to argue that these studies are either 
unreliable or do not generalize across times and situations. See generally Harold 
Pashler & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Editors’ Introduction to the Special Section on 
Replicability in Psychological Science: A Crisis of Confidence?, 7 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 528 (2012). The result has been a call for more transparency and 
availability of data, and for greater efforts to replicate research results. See John 
Bohannon, Psychologists Launch a Bare-All Research Initiative, SCIENCE (Mar. 5, 
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any skepticism that may be encountered and to ensure that the best 
available research is being taught in the classroom. 
Another area where an instructor should maintain familiarity 
focuses more directly on the empirical claims of behavioral legal 
ethics itself. For example, within the last few years there has been a 
renewed debate over Stanley Milgram’s seminal shock experiments, 
with at least one well-known critic challenging the methodological 
basis of his experiments.215 Others defend Milgram’s studies, 
concluding that, even if there are legitimate questions about any of 
his methods, his results are sound216—a conclusion supported by the 
repeated replications of his findings.217 Anyone interested in teaching 
about Milgram’s work should become familiar enough with this 
debate to be versatile about the continued viability of the obedience 
studies.
Similarly, other areas of recent research have shed important 
light on the scientific claims made by behavioral legal ethics. For 
example, in a recent study researchers sought to determine the extent 
to which certain types of conflicts of interest can be reduced through 
                                                                                                                
2013), http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/03/psychologists-launch-bare-all-research-
initiative [https://perma.cc/Z2CY-672Q]. Some do not see a crisis, see, for example, 
Lisa Feldman Barrett, Psychology Is Not in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/opinion/psychology-is-not-in-crisis.html?_r=2 
[https://perma.cc/XK4F-YFSQ], while others believe that these events will lead to 
better research methods and sounder results. See Gary Marcus, The Crisis in Social 
Psychology That Isn’t, NEW YORKER (May 1, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
tech/elements/the-crisis-in-social-psychology-that-isnt [https://perma.cc/5V26-UMQH]. 
At this point, it is too early to know how this debate will be resolved. At the very 
minimum, instructors in behavioral legal ethics should not rely on any claims that 
have limited empirical support and should keep an eye toward any consensus that 
emerges as the replicability discussion continues to unfold. 
 215. See GINA PERRY, BEHIND THE SHOCK MACHINE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
THE NOTORIOUS MILGRAM PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS (2013). See generally Cari 
Romm, Rethinking One of Psychology’s Most Infamous Experiments, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/01/rethinking-one-of-
psychologys-most-infamous-experiments/384913/ [https://perma.cc/MH4J-9DBY].  
 216. See, e.g., Carol Tavris, Book Review: ‘Behind the Shock Machine’ by 
Gina Perry, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2013, at C5; Nestar Russell, Book Review: Gina 
Perry. Behind the Shock Machine: The Untold Story of the Notorious Milgram 
Psychology Experiments, 49 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 221 (2013). 
 217. See Perlman, supra note 41, at 458 (“Milgram’s findings have been 
replicated throughout the world, with similar results in both genders, different 
socioeconomic groups, and different countries.”). One famous recent partial 
replication is by Dr. Jerry Burger, who was able—within current ethical 
constraints—to establish that levels of obedience have changed little since 
Milgram’s original work. See Burger, Replicating Milgram, supra note 94; see also
O’Grady, supra note 40, at 16-18 (discussing Dr. Burger’s replication study). 
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the use of deliberative forms of reasoning—such as making people 
explicitly consider the costs of succumbing to the conflict or 
appealing to their sense of morality about the conflict.218 According 
to the results, subtle conflicts of interest produced by slight financial 
incentives can be reduced through use of the explicit interventions 
proposed.219 This, of course, is only one study and its external 
validity needs to be carefully assessed.220 However, if its findings can 
be replicated, especially in the types of situations where lawyers face 
real world conflicts, it suggests that the errors produced by bounded 
ethicality may be diminished—at least in some instances—by 
explicit forms of reasoning, a finding that provides some optimism 
that ethical blind spots can be overcome.221
Another study of importance was recently conducted by Dan 
Kahan and his colleagues, which suggests that motivated reasoning 
may not be as powerful in causing biased judgments by legal 
practitioners as previously supposed.222 In the study, state court 
judges and lawyers223 were asked to make judgments about the 
meaning of key words in a statute based on vignettes that were meant 
to invoke what is described as “identity-protective cognition,” which 
refers to a species of motivated reasoning that produces political 
polarization in certain types of decisions.224 The study’s results 
                                                     
 218. See Yuval Feldman & Eliran Halali, Can We Regulate ‘Good’ People in 
Subtle Conflicts of Interest Situations, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (July 10, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2536575 [https://perma.cc/WU7M-YYYR]. In the study, 
the researchers provided subjects who had filled out a questionnaire with the 
possibility of a small financial incentive of $1.00 to slant their answers in a 
particular direction. This produced what the researchers term a “subtle conflict of 
interest” between the subjects’ own financial self-interest and their non-biased 
responses to the questionnaire. Id. at 21. 
 219. Id.
 220. For example, the financial incentive in the study—the possibility of an 
additional payment of $1.00—is insignificant compared to the substantial financial 
incentives that can exist for a lawyer who must forgo a fee from a potential client 
because of a conflict of interest. See id. at 25. 
 221. But see Max Bazerman & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Social Psychology 
of Ordinary Ethical Failures, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 111, 111 (2004) (“[S]uch measures 
simply bypass the vast majority of unethical behaviors that occur without the 
conscious awareness of the actors who engage in them.”). 
 222. Kahan et al., supra note 113.  
 223. The study also evaluated the responses of law students and members of 
the general public. Id. at 375-76. 
 224. See id. at 354-55 (defining “identity-protective cognition” as “the 
species of motivated reasoning known to generate political polarization over risks 
and myriad policy and legally consequential facts”). Also known as “cultural 
cognition,” the central idea is that people reason based on “the influence of group 
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demonstrated that judges and lawyers are not susceptible to 
motivated cognition based on their cultural values, at least with 
regard to the types of legal judgments they make when engaging in 
legal analysis such as statutory interpretation.225
These findings must be taken seriously in any discussions of 
behavioral legal ethics. On the one hand, the study suggests that legal 
training may immunize lawyers from the types of motivated 
judgments previously described.226 If so, instructors who teach 
behavioral legal ethics must incorporate this study and its findings 
into any lesson about the role of motivated cognition and legal 
ethics. On the other hand, the scope of the study suggests that more 
research is needed before any definitive conclusions can be made 
about the relationship between motivated cognition and legal ethics. 
For example, the study addressed only one type of motivated 
reasoning, which focuses on identity-protective characteristics. 
Whether the same results can be expected in other situations, such as 
where lawyers are confronted with choices that pit their professional 
obligations against self-interest, remains to be seen.227 In addition, the 
study did not concern lawyers acting as advocates in pursuit of client 
objectives; rather, the lawyers in the study were asked to interpret a 
statute’s meaning from a neutral position, as if they were 
adjudicating a dispute.228 Whether lawyers would respond the same 
way as partisans as they would as arbiters remains to be seen.229 For 
                                                                                                                
values—ones relating to equality and authority, individualism and community—on 
risk perceptions and related beliefs.” Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications 
Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 296 (2010). As but one example,  
Citizens who subscribe to an egalitarian ethic that identifies free markets 
as fonts of unjust disparity readily credit evidence that commerce and 
industry are destroying the environment; citizens who adhere to an 
individualistic ethic that prizes private orderings dismiss such evidence 
and insist instead that needless government regulation threatens to wreck 
economic prosperity.  
Kahan et al., supra note 108, at 859. 
 225. See Kahan et al., supra note 113, at 412-13. 
 226. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (describing research 
demonstrating that lawyers and other professionals are susceptible to motivated 
reasoning based on self-interest); see also Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social 
Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of 
the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81, 89 (2008) (“Motivated 
reasoning manifests itself as a tendency to evaluate information in a way beneficial 
to the agent’s narrow self-interest.”). 
 228. See supra note 113 (describing the study’s methodology). 
 229. For a description of how lawyers are susceptible to partisan bias that 
favors their clients, see Perlman, supra note 12, at 1654-57. 
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present purposes, the point is not to determine the full value of the 
study, which no doubt provides important insights into legal 
decision-making and judgment. Rather, it is to note that anybody 
who teaches behavioral legal ethics must stay atop the research to 
make sure that students are exposed to the most recent and relevant 
scientific findings in the field. 
C. Alternative Approaches and Future Directions 
The description in Part II provides a blueprint of one approach 
for how to teach behavioral ethics as part of a professional 
responsibility survey course. For those who are looking for other 
ideas, approaches are starting to emerge.230 For example, Vivien 
Holmes from Australian National University (ANU) School of Law 
recently described a model that she and her colleagues have 
developed to teach behavioral science to approximately 600 students 
per semester as part of a required course that includes ethics 
education.231 Based on an innovative pedagogy developed for 
business education known as Giving Voice to Values (GVV),232 the 
ANU curriculum employs online video scenarios raising ethical 
challenges for the student viewer.233 In web conferences with 
colleagues and mentors, students are required to practice responding 
                                                     
 230. In addition, there are at least two course books that incorporate some 
aspects of behavioral science into discussions of legal ethics. See supra note 13. 
 231. See Holmes, supra note 15.  
 232. The central idea of GVV is that students need to learn more than how to 
resolve difficult ethical dilemmas; rather, they must also develop the skills to act 
upon their values in situations where there are deep pressures to act unethically. See
MARY C. GENTILE, GIVING VOICE TO VALUES: HOW TO SPEAK YOUR MIND WHEN 
YOU KNOW WHAT’S RIGHT (2010); The Giving Voice to Values Curriculum, BABSON 
C., http://www.babson.edu/Academics/teaching-research/gvv/Pages/home.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/3L4R-JRS8] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). Through a structured curriculum 
that draws extensively on research findings from behavioral ethics and that employs 
case studies and simulations, students are taught how to develop what has been 
described as a “moral muscle”—where, through practice and preparation, they pre-
script and rehearse approaches to acting ethically in difficult situations. See GENTILE,
supra, at ix-xvii. In this way, students learn techniques to prepare for and resist the 
temptations and pressures that can cause unethical behavior. See id. at xii. 
 233. Called the Professional Practice Core course, the class incorporates a 
number of doctrinal areas, including ethics, into an online curriculum in which 
students participate in “virtual” law firms to provide advice to clients. See Holmes, 
supra note 15, at 128-29. During the semester, the students are confronted with a 
number of ethical dilemmas, such as how to respond to a senior partner who wants 
to assert a frivolous claim of privilege or a request that a lawyer falsely affirm 
witnessing a signature. See id. at 130. 
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to these challenges as if they were junior lawyers attempting to act 
ethically. In this way, students learn how to identify and overcome 
barriers to ethical behavior, including strategizing how to counteract 
demands from superiors that can produce misconduct.234 Early 
evaluations of the program have been quite promising.235
Other approaches, although not focused on legal ethics per se, 
are also available. For example, two leading scholars on behavioral 
legal ethics, Professors Robbennolt and Sternlight, each teach a 
course on psychology and lawyering that uses role-plays, 
simulations, and other experiential methods to teach students about 
the psychology of decision-making.236 In her course, for instance, 
Professor Robbennolt administers an in-class survey in the first class 
that helps students experience many of the heuristics and cognitive 
biases that they will study throughout the semester.237 And in her 
course, Professor Sternlight stages an encounter with a colleague 
early in the semester to help the students understand the fallibility 
and malleability of memory.238 These and other techniques help 
students in both classes gain an appreciation for the many ways that 
subtle psychological factors will influence their decisions as lawyers. 
Finally, anyone interested in teaching behavioral legal ethics 
would be well served to review the videos and associated materials 
created by Ethics Unwrapped.239 In use by hundreds of educational 
institutions,240 these videos intersperse interviews of students 
discussing ethical questions with engaging whiteboard animation on 
a wide range of topics and are accompanied by teaching notes and 
references for further reading. I have found many of the videos, 
especially those that discuss core aspects of behavioral ethics, to be 
very helpful in teaching my students. Other instructors could do 
                                                     
 234. See id. at 134. 
 235. See id. at 133-34 (noting that students after the course report much less 
willingness to follow suggestions from superiors to act unethically than they did 
prior to taking the course). 
 236. See Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 378-79. 
 237. Id. at 378-79. This exercise highlights a number of cognitive biases and 
heuristics, including “the effects of availability, anchoring, representativeness, self-
serving bias, the options under consideration, cognitive reflection, and hindsight bias.” Id.
 238. Id. at 379. 
 239. Minette Drumwright et al., About Ethics Unwrapped, ETHICS
UNWRAPPED, http://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/about [https://perma.cc/W2J5-MXDZ] 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 240. As of recently, the Ethics Unwrapped materials have been in use in over 
500 colleges and universities; the project has received numerous awards; and their videos 
have had over 360,000 YouTube views. See Email from Cara Biasucci, Program 
Director, Ethics Unwrapped (Dec. 15, 2015, 00:00 EST) (on file with author). 
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much more—for example, although the videos have been developed 
for business students, it would be easy to adapt them as the basis for 
an entire curriculum to teach behavioral legal ethics. Perhaps an 
intrepid educator might even be inspired to produce a similar set of 
videos focusing on the particular types of ethical problems that 
lawyers face. The success of Ethics Unwrapped suggests that such a 
project geared toward legal ethics, if done well, could be quite 
effective.241
As these examples demonstrate, we are in the early stages of 
developing ways to teach behavioral legal ethics. Those of us with an 
interest in exploring how to teach the psychology of ethical decision-
making—both in law schools and more broadly across professional 
disciples as a whole—have much to learn from each other.242 As we 
do, and the field continues to mature, new methodologies will 
develop, generating new and exciting ways to teach behavioral 
science in the ethics curriculum. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Behavioral legal ethics, now firmly rooted in legal scholarship, 
is starting to find its way into the law school curriculum. This Article 
describes my approach to teaching legal ethics from a behavioral 
perspective. Using a model that integrates the use of technology and 
multimedia, role-plays and simulations, and other forms of 
experiential learning into the survey course on legal ethics, this 
Article’s central thesis is that law students should have grounding in 
the psychological influences and social pressures that are likely to 
await them in practice. Preliminary results have been encouraging, 
suggesting that teaching from this perspective can provide an 
engaging way to incorporate the insights from behavioral science 
into the professional responsibility curriculum. 
                                                     
 241. Awards We’ve Won!, ETHICS UNWRAPPED, http://ethicsunwrapped. 
utexas.edu/about [https://perma.cc/6PHZ-33RZ] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 242. See Eldred, supra note 45, at 2. 
